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1191 
Article 
Beyond the Article I Horizon: Congress’s 
Enumerated Powers and Universal 
Jurisdiction over Drug Crimes 
Eugene Kontorovich† 
In March 2007, the United States Coast Guard boarded a 
suspicious Panamanian vessel that had been spotted by a sur-
veillance plane.1 The boarding resulted in the largest maritime 
cocaine seizure to date: over forty-two thousand pounds uncut.2 
Fourteen crewmembers were arrested, and the eleven non-
Panamanian detainees were brought to Florida for prosecu-
tion.3  
Yet the seizure did not take place in U.S. waters.4 It took 
place in Panamanian territorial waters, approximately one 
thousand nautical miles from Miami.5 Moreover, none of the 
 
†  Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. The au-
thor thanks John McGinnis and David Sloss for their comments and the 
Northwestern University School of Law Faculty Research Program for its ge-
nerous support. Copyright © 2009 by Eugene Kontorovich. 
 1. News Release, U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., DEA, Coast Guard 
Make Record Maritime Cocaine Seizure (Mar. 21, 2007), available at http:// 
www.dea.gov/pubs/states/newsrel/wdo032107.html [hereinafter U.S. Drug En-
forcement Admin. News Release]; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
Remarks by Homeland Sec. Sec’y Michael Chertoff, U.S. Coast Guard Com-
mandant Admiral Thad Allen and Drug Enforcement Admin. Adm’r Karen 
Tandy at a Press Conference Announcing the Coast Guard’s Record Maritime 
Cocaine Seizure (Mar. 21, 2007), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/ 
releases/pr_1174566428378.shtm [hereinafter U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. 
Press Release]. 
 2. U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin. News Release, supra note 1; U.S. 
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Press Release, supra note 1. 
 3. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Press Release, supra note 1 (stating that 
the U.S. Coast Guard would turn over custody of the three Panamanian crew 
members to the Panamanian government and bring the eleven Mexican na-
tionals to the United States). 
 4. U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin. News Release, supra note 1; U.S. 
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Press Release, supra note 1. 
 5. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Press Release, supra note 1 (noting that 
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crew—now facing decades or life in U.S. jails—were Ameri-
cans.6 Finally, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 
conceded the drugs were not bound for the United States.7 
This case, while exceptional in the amount seized, is oth-
erwise not unusual. It repeats itself dozens of times each year, 
as the United States enforces its own drug laws in foreign terri-
tory.8 This Article examines which if any of Congress’s enume-
rated powers authorize it to regulate such purely foreign drug 
trafficking.9 
The international law doctrine of universal jurisdiction 
(UJ) holds that a nation can prosecute certain serious interna-
tional offenses even though it has no connection to the conduct 
or participants.10 It has increasingly been used by European 
national courts and international tribunals to prosecute alleged 
human rights violations around the world.11 The United States, 
however, has been wary of these developments.12 
 
the Coast Guard seized the cocaine from a vessel approximately twenty miles 
off the coast of Panama). Thus, the seizure occurred in Panama’s “contiguous 
zone,” which runs up to twenty-four nautical miles from its coast. See United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 33, Dec. 10, 1983, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 409 (defining contiguous zones and giving states some police powers 
over them). 
 6. See U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin. News Release, supra note 1; U.S. 
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Press Release, supra note 1. 
 7. See U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Press Release, supra note 1 (stating 
that the vessel was bound for Mexico). 
 8. See, e.g., id. (reviewing the DEA’s recent cash and drug seizures 
abroad). 
 9. The wisdom or propriety of such action as a matter of drug policy, in-
ternational relations, or even international law is not the subject of this Ar-
ticle. 
 10. See Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 371 (E.D. 
La. 1997) (“Where a state has universal jurisdiction, it may punish conduct 
although the state has no links of territoriality or nationality with the offender 
or victim.” (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 
cmt. a (1987))). See generally Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Mod-
ern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow Foundation, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J., 183, 190–
92 (2004) (discussing the origins of and basis for UJ). 
 11. See generally LUC REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: INTERNA-
TIONAL AND MUNICIPAL PERSPECTIVES (2003) (providing an overview of UJ in 
international law and specifically describing the use of UJ in fourteen coun-
tries); David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Op-Ed., Europe's Runaway Prose-
cutions, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2007, at A19 (discussing the use of UJ by Euro-
pean nations in attempting to prosecute American officials for alleged 
violations of international law). 
 12. The United States, for example, opposed granting UJ to the Interna-
tional Criminal Court. See Kontorovich, supra note 10, at 200 & n.101. Even 
the U.S. statute criminalizing genocide, widely regarded as the paradigmatic 
modern UJ crime, only applies to crimes that directly involve the United 
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However, under a little-known statute, America uses UJ 
far more than any other nation, and perhaps even more than 
all other nations combined. For two decades, the United States 
has been punishing drug crimes (including possession) commit-
ted entirely by foreigners outside U.S. territory, with no de-
monstrable connection to the United States.13 Under the Mari-
time Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA),14 the U.S. Coast 
Guard apprehends vessels carrying drugs on the high seas, of-
ten thousands of miles from American waters; the crews of 
these vessels are prosecuted in U.S. courts for violating U.S. 
drug law, and are sentenced to terms in U.S. jails. In none of 
these cases is there any evidence the drugs were destined for 
the United States. While European UJ prosecutions in war 
crimes and genocide cases attract a great deal of attention be-
cause they involve major wars and high government officials, 
the MDLEA cases have gone almost unnoticed—perhaps be-
cause the defendants are undistinguished members of the Latin 
American drug trade. 
The MDLEA’s UJ provisions raise fundamental questions 
about the source and extent of Congress’s constitutional power 
to regulate purely foreign conduct. Courts have said the 
MDLEA fits under Congress’s power to “define and punish Pi-
racies and Felonies committed on the high Seas.”15 This raises 
the unexplored question of whether that provision has any ju-
risdictional limits. 
Perhaps no Article I power of Congress has received less 
attention than “Piracies and Felonies.”16 This Article is the 
second in a two-part project examining the limits of Congress’s 
power under the Define and Punish Clause and related is-
 
States. 18 U.S.C. § 1091(d) (2006) (requiring the offense to be committed by a 
U.S. national or in U.S. territory). 
 13. Congress passed the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act in 1986. 
See Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified as amended at 46 
U.S.C.A. §§ 70501–70507 (2007)). 
 14. 46 U.S.C.A. § 70502(a), (c)(1)(A), (c)(1)(C) (2007).  
 15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (“Define and Punish Clause”). When 
speaking of particular parts of the Clause, this Article will refer to the high 
seas power as the “Piracies and Felonies” provision, and to the law of nations 
power as the “Offenses” provision. 
 16. See United States v. Biermann, 678 F. Supp. 1437, 1445 (N.D. Cal. 
1988) (“The courts of the United States have not had many occasions to in-
terpret this constitutional provision.”); THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTI-
TUTION 126 (Edward Meese III et al. eds., 2005) (stating that the Clause “at-
tracted little discussion at the Founding and has not proven controversial”); 
Curtis A. Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and U.S. Law, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 323, 337 (“[T]he scope of the Define and Punish Clause is unclear.”). 
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sues.17 It is the first academic work examining the scope of 
these powers. The companion article shows that the Define and 
Punish Clause authorizes UJ over—at most—crimes that in-
ternational law has established as universally cognizable.18 
This limit applies both to the “Felonies” power and the “Of-
fences against the Law of Nations” provision.19 Thus the Define 
and Punish Clause does not generally authorize Congress to 
regulate foreign conduct with no demonstrable U.S. connec-
tion.20 Congress cannot punish dog-fighting by Indonesians in 
Java because Congress has not been authorized by the Consti-
tution to make such laws. Some UJ may be permissible, but on-
ly in narrowly defined circumstances involving offenses treated 
as universally cognizable by international law. This Article con-
tends that most or all of the MDLEA’s jurisdictional provisions 
go beyond Congress’s Article I powers in several ways.  
The point can be seen most clearly by looking at the “Pira-
cies and Felonies” provision in isolation from the Offenses pow-
er. The former consists of two distinct powers—one over pira-
cies, the other over felonies. The powers are mentioned 
separately because they are in practice different. Piracy was at 
the time of the Framing, and has been until recently, the only 
UJ crime.21 UJ was synonymous with the jurisdiction that ap-
plied to pirates.22 Indeed, UJ was the only characteristic that 
fundamentally distinguished piracy from other high seas felo-
nies.23 
 
 17. See Eugene Kontorovich, The “Define and Punish” Clause and the 
Limits of Universal Jurisdiction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 149 (2009), for the first 
part of the project. 
 18. See id. at 151. 
 19. See id.  
 20. See id. at 192–93. 
 21. See Kontorovich, supra note 10, at 190, 205 (discussing piracy’s status 
as the prototypical UJ crime).  
 22. See id. at 190. 
 23. See id.; United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 162 (1820) 
(noting the “general practice of all nations in punishing all persons, whether 
natives or foreigners, who have committed this offence against any persons 
whatsoever”); Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 159–60 (1795) (“[A]ll pira-
cies and trespasses committed against the general law of nations, are inquira-
ble, and may be proceeded against, in any nation . . . .”); United States v. Rob-
ins, 27 F. Cas. 825, 862 (D.S.C. 1799) (No. 16,175) (“[P]iracy under the law of 
nations which alone is punishable by all nations” (quoting Hon. John Mar-
shall, Speech Delivered in the House of Representatives, in 4 THE PAPERS OF 
JOHN MARSHALL 10 (Charles T. Cullen & Leslie Tobias eds., 1984) (emphasis 
added)); see also United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 104 (2d Cir. 2003) (“The 
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Piracy’s unique status as a UJ offense suggests that its 
enumeration as a separate power specifically allows Congress 
to exercise UJ only over piracy, but not over other high seas fe-
lonies or international law offenses. To allow non-UJ crimes to 
be punished on a UJ basis would be to erase the distinction 
that was made in the Constitution between “Piracies” and “Fe-
lonies.” The same argument applies to “Offences against the 
Law of Nations,” of which piracy was also one. This under-
standing, while only suggested by the text, is confirmed by ex-
amining the view of those Founders who expressed themselves 
on the matter, as well as the leading jurists of the early Repub-
lic. It is reflected in Supreme Court decisions, as well as Con-
gress’s interpretation of its own powers. These lessons have ap-
parently been forgotten, and the MDLEA cases barely mention 
the Piracies and Felonies power.24 
In short, the MDLEA can only be a valid exercise of the Fe-
lonies power if the drug offenses are UJ offenses in interna-
tional law—which they are not. The Piracies and Felonies pow-
er has another limit: it only applies on the high seas.25 Yet as 
this Article shows, many applications of the MDLEA extend 
beyond the high seas, suggesting they are invalid for an addi-
tional reason.  
The issue has both practical and theoretical importance. 
Hundreds if not thousands of foreigners are in jail under this 
statute, which lies, at best, at the far edge of Congress’s Article 
I powers. Furthermore, exploring the potential Article I basis 
for the MDLEA exposes several important and novel questions 
of constitutional and international law in addition to the issue 
of UJ under the Define and Punish Clause explored in the com-
panion Article. Analyzing the MDLEA takes one on a journey 
through many of the Constitution’s foreign relations provisions. 
Can Congress “define” a crime as an offense against interna-
tional law when international law does not seem to treat it as 
such? To what extent can Congress assert UJ over acts commit-
ted not just in international waters but in foreign territory? 
Can the Foreign Commerce Clause be used to regulate conduct 
with no U.S. nexus? Can a treaty retroactively validate an oth-
 
class of crimes subject to universal jurisdiction traditionally included only pi-
racy.”). 
 24. But see United States v. Shi, 525 F.3d 709, 721 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting 
that the U.S. Supreme Court has “treat[ed] ‘Piracies,’ ‘Felonies,’ and ‘Of-
fenses’ . . . as three separate offenses” (citing United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 
(5 Wheat.) 153, 158–59 (1820)).  
 25. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
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erwise unconstitutional statute? Do Senate declarations made 
when ratifying count as part of the treaty for the purpose of 
Congress’s lawmaking powers?  
Part I explains the history and purposes of the MDLEA 
and outlines the provisions that apply without any nexus to the 
United States. Part II explains that the Felonies power does 
not authorize UJ over offenses that international law does not 
treat as universally cognizable. It goes on to discuss how much 
discretion Congress has to define whether an offense is univer-
sally cognizable when international law is unclear on the mat-
ter. Part III then applies this framework to drug smuggling and 
finds no support in international custom for treating it as a UJ 
crime. Thus Congress cannot treat it as piracy. Rather, it can 
only punish drug trafficking if it has a U.S. nexus. Part III con-
siders ways in which other international jurisdictional rules 
might expand the definition of piracy or otherwise support 
some aspects of the MDLEA. It also explains that some applica-
tions of the statute will be unconstitutional for an additional 
reason: they do not happen on the high seas. Part IV looks to 
other potential powers that might provide a constitutional basis 
for the MDLEA, such as the treaty power and Foreign Com-
merce Clause. The Article concludes that there is no clear Ar-
ticle I source for many of the MDLEA’s provisions applying 
U.S. law in the absence of a U.S. nexus. Other applications 
would depend on difficult interpretations of novel issues that 
would at least require more careful analysis and explicit dis-
cussion than the cursory treatment courts have thus far given 
such cases. 
I.  BACKGROUND   
A. EXPANDING JURISDICTION ON THE HIGH SEAS 
The increasing flow of drugs from Central and South 
America into the United States—first marijuana in the 1970s 
and then the more profitable cocaine in the 1980s26—and the 
increasing sophistication of the smugglers led Congress to 
gradually expand the scope of its extraterritorial lawmaking.27 
 
 26. See, e.g., DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN-
ISTRATION: A TRADITION OF EXCELLENCE 1973–2003, at 31, 35–36 (2003), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/history/history_part1.pdf. 
 27. See, e.g., Marijuana on the High Seas Act, Pub. L. No. 96-350, 94 Stat. 
1159 (1980) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 70501–70507 (2007)) (ex-
tending U.S. jurisdiction over foreigners on the high seas). 
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Because of the difficulty of catching traffickers in the relatively 
short time they are in U.S. waters, the United States began 
projecting its enforcement increasingly far from its shores.28 
Today the Coast Guard patrols the oceans thousands of miles 
away—and often just off the coasts of other states—as part of 
U.S. anti-drug efforts.29 And to ensure the Coast Guard’s ability 
to catch those with drugs bound for the United States, Con-
gress cast a net that pulls in—and makes subject to U.S. law—
even those foreign vessels whose cargo is not demonstrably des-
tined here. 
1. Marijuana on the High Seas Act 
The MDLEA built on and expanded the jurisdictional pro-
visions of its predecessor, the Marijuana on the High Seas Act 
(MHSA), passed in 1980.30 Drug importation had significantly 
increased in the 1970s, and Coast Guard interdiction efforts be-
came an important part of the War on Drugs.31 Smugglers 
adopted a “mothership” strategy, where a large drug-laden ship 
would hover on the high seas, just outside of U.S. customs wa-
ters, and bring the contraband to shore via many small and dif-
ficult to detect boats.32 When the motherships were seized on 
the high seas, successful prosecution proved elusive.33 The mo-
therships themselves were generally foreign-flagged and for-
eign-crewed, and proving a conspiracy to import was apparent-
ly difficult.34 The House Report on the bill complained that the 
impunity of the foreign drug traffickers hurt Coast Guard mo-
rale.35  
 
 28. See H.R. REP. NO. 96-323, at 4 (1979) (stating that a majority of 
smuggling vessels penetrated the blockade off the U.S. coasts and that the 
Coast Guard was only able to seize “at best, 8 to 10 percent” of the drugs 
transported by them). 
 29. Coast Guard Drug Interdiction, We Are Still in the Business, EVENING 
COLORS (U.S. Coast Guard), Apr. 2004, at 2, available at http://www.uscg.mil/ 
HQ/CG1/PSC/retnews/2004/April2004News.pdf (“The Coast Guard’s mission is 
to reduce the supply of drugs from the source by denying smugglers the use of 
air and maritime routes in the Transit Zone, a six million square mile area, 
including the Caribbean, Gulf of Mexico and Eastern Pacific.”). 
 30. Pub. L. No. 96-350, 94 Stat. 1159 (1980).  
 31. See H.R. REP. NO. 96-323, at 5. 
 32. See id. at 3–4. 
 33. See id. at 4 (“The only prosecutable offense in many cases was con-
spiracy to import, a very difficult crime to prove.”). 
 34. See id. at 5. 
 35. See id. at 7 (“[M]orale suffers severely when recidivist smugglers, ap-
prehended repeatedly . . . are released from custody and the smuggling organ-
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The main relevant innovation of the MHSA was to extend 
U.S. jurisdiction on the high seas not just to “U.S. vessels,” but 
also to a new category, “vessels subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States.”36 This latter category was defined as stateless 
vessels, meaning a vessel flying no flag, or bearing fraudulent 
or multiple registries.37 Earlier drafts of the legislation sought 
to extend jurisdiction to genuinely foreign vessels whenever the 
flag state consents.38 However, the Committee on Merchant 
Marine and Fisheries reported “[v]arious jurisdictional and 
constitutional” objections to using a state’s “prior consent as a 
basis for . . . domestic criminal jurisdiction.”39 The constitution-
al concerns were not made explicit, and the chief worry seemed 
to be about international law, which was understood to require 
a nexus for prosecution.40 The statute’s authors seemed to 
think that as a matter of international law, flag state consent 
would still be an inadequate basis given that drug trafficking 
“is not generally accepted as an international crime.”41 Howev-
er, under the MHSA, a “purported flag state” could reject a ves-
sel’s claim of nationality.42 Thus the Marijuana on the High 
Seas Act swept in cases involving foreigners on the high seas, 
on non-American vessels, without proof that the vessel or cargo 
was destined for America. Moreover, the alleged flag state’s 
ability to deny claims of registry at its discretion could function 
as an informal version of consent jurisdiction.  
2. Adopting the MDLEA 
The MHSA proved anachronistic almost as soon as it was 
adopted.43 The cocaine boom of the 1980s lead to a vast in-
crease in drug smuggling and a correlate demand for more ag-
gressive action.44 The 1980 statute, designed for the marijuana 
 
ization merely writes off the lost cargo and vessel as the cost of doing busi-
ness.”). 
 36. Pub. L. No. 96-350, 94 Stat. 1159 (1980). 
 37. Id. § 2(d). 
 38. See H.R. REP. NO. 96-323, at 7. 
 39. Id.  
 40. See id. at 7, 20. 
 41. Id. at 20. 
 42. Id. at 23. 
 43. See Marijuana on the High Seas Act, Pub. L. No. 96-350, 94 Stat. 1159 
(1980) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C.A. § 70501–70507 (2007)); S. REP. No. 
96-855, at 1 (1980). 
 44. See Stopping “Mother Ships”—A Loophole in Drug Enforcement: Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 1 (1978) (statement of Hon. John C. Culver) (“Re-
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era, now seemed weak.45 Thus, in 1986, Congress expanded the 
jurisdictional provisions of its maritime drug laws once again.46  
The Senate Report claimed the MHSA was troublesome to 
enforce.47 Extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign vessels 
turned on defects in registry.48 However, evidence of a vessel’s 
nationality took several days to obtain from the defendant’s 
home state.49 It could be hard to prove whether a vessel was 
stateless.50 Obtaining such evidence that would be “sufficient to 
withstand evidentiary objections in a U.S. courtroom can take 
months.”51 The MDLEA sought to avoid such problems by ex-
panding jurisdiction far beyond stateless vessels.52 
First, the MDLEA extended jurisdiction to any vessel with 
some U.S. connection.53 This included anyone aboard vessels 
registered in the United States, owned or formerly owned, in 
whole or part by U.S. nationals or corporations;54 U.S. nation-
als and resident aliens aboard any vessels;55 as well as any ves-
sel in U.S. territorial or customs waters.56 However, the statute 
 
cently we have been witnessing an increase in smuggling of cocaine . . . into 
our country from South America. . . . The overall impact of this smuggling is 
enormous.”). 
 45. Id. (“Unfortunately, current law requires that U.S. authorities often 
must witness the distribution of the drugs from the mother ships to the small-
er boats. Mere possession of illegal drugs on the high seas in itself is not a 
crime.”). 
 46. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903 (2000) (current version at 46 U.S.C.A. 
§ 70502 (2007)). 
 47. S. REP. NO. 95-797, at 15 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5986, 5993 [hereinafter 1986 SENATE REPORT] (“Section 17 is needed because 
defendants in cases involving foreign or stateless vessel boardings and sei-
zures have been relying heavily on international jurisdictional questions as 
legal technicalities to escape conviction.”). 
 48. Id. (“[T]he Coast Guard does not board a vessel claiming foreign regi-
stry until the foreign nation involved has indicated its consent or has denied 
the vessel’s claim of registry.”). 
 49. Id. at 16, as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5986, 5994 (“It is esti-
mated that acquiring such documentation consumes from 2.5 to 8 days of U.S. 
Government personnel time for each case.”). 
 50. Id. at 15, as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5986, 5993. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 16, as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5986, 5994 (“Section 17 
defines ‘vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States’ to include a ves-
sel without nationality . . . .”). 
 53. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(c) (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (current version at 46 
U.S.C.A. § 70502(c) (2007)). 
 54. Id. § 1903(b)(2)–(3) (current version at 46 U.S.C.A. § 70502(b)(2)–(3) 
(2007)). 
 55. Id.  
 56. Id. § 1903(a) (current version at 46 U.S.C.A. § 70502(a) (2007)). 
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also applied U.S. drug laws (not just importation laws) to ves-
sels that fall outside this broad description, and even to foreign-
crewed vessels in foreign waters.57 Indeed, the MDLEA ex-
panded on the MHSA by extending U.S. jurisdiction to any for-
eign vessels on the high seas, or even in foreign territorial wa-
ters, so long as the relevant foreign nation consents.58 
This consent is broadly defined—it may be “oral”—and not 
subject to challenge in court: it “may be verified or denied by 
radio, telephone, or similar oral or electronic means.”59 Moreo-
ver, the MDLEA expanded the definition of stateless vessels to 
include those that do not produce evidence of their registry 
when requested by the Coast Guard60—a request which, on the 
high seas or in foreign territorial waters, they may feel fully en-
titled to reject—as well as those whose registry is not “affirma-
tively and unequivocally” confirmed by the foreign state.61 Giv-
en that the Senate Report makes clear that obtaining any kind 
of registry confirmation from foreign states is slow, difficult, 
and confusing, this provision would sweep in many genuinely 
foreign (not actually lacking a legitimate registry) vessels.62 
Because these vessels are classified as “vessels subject to 
the jurisdiction of the United States,” no conspiracy to import 
need be proven;63 they are treated exactly as if they were U.S. 
ships, which fall within Congress’s broad admiralty powers.64 
Thus, the statute criminalizes mere “possession” on the foreign 
vessels in foreign or international waters.65 Moreover, the sta-
tute brushes aside any presumptions against extraterritoriali-
ty,66 and bars any jurisdictional or substantive defenses based 
 
 57. Id. § 1903(c)(1)(C) (current version at 46 U.S.C.A. § 70502(c)(1)(C) 
(2007)). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. § 1903(c)(2) (current version at 46 U.S.C.A. § 70502(c)(2) (2007)). 
 60. Id. § 1903(c)(2)(B) (current version at 46 U.S.C.A. § 70502(c)(2)(B) 
(2007)). 
 61. Id. § 1903(c)(2)(C) (current version at 46 U.S.C.A. § 70502(c)(2)(C) 
(2007)). 
 62. 1986 SENATE REPORT, supra note 47, at 16, as reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5986, 5994. 
 63. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(c) (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (current version at 46 
U.S.C.A. § 70502(c) (2007)). 
 64. See United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 149–54 (1933) (holding that 
Congress has a general power of legislation within admiralty jurisdiction, 
which includes U.S. vessels). 
 65. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(b)(2)–(3) (2000) (current version at 46 U.S.C.A. 
§ 70502(b)(2)–(3) (2007)). 
 66. Id. § 1903(h) (current version at 46 U.S.C.A. 70503(b) (2007)) (“This 
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on the United States’ “failure to comply with international 
law.”67 Indeed, a 1996 amendment sought to keep all questions 
of statelessness away from a jury by providing that 
“[j]urisdiction of the United States with respect to vessels sub-
ject to this chapter is not an element of any offense . . . [and in-
stead] are preliminary questions of law to be determined solely 
by the trial judge.”68 With the cocaine epidemic raging, the 
“constitutional objections” that had dissuaded Congress from 
adopting a state-consent model of jurisdiction for the MHSA 
were absent from the discussion of the MDLEA. 
Congress did not specify which head of Article I authority 
it exercised when enacting the MDLEA or its predecessor. 
However, courts have consistently seen the law as authorized 
by the Define and Punish Clause because “that clause is the on-
ly specific grant of power to be found in the Constitution for the 
punishment of offenses outside the territorial limits of the 
United States.”69 A few courts have implied that the act must 
be an exercise of the felonies power in particular, though most 
have mistakenly spoke of “Piracies and Felonies” as if they are 
synonymous or interchangeable.70 Since this clause speaks di-
rectly to criminal legislation for the high seas, it seems to be 
the natural place to seek authority for the MDLEA.  
 
section is intended to reach acts of possession, manufacture, or distribution 
committed outside the United States.”). 
 67. Id. § 1903(d) (current version at 46 U.S.C.A. § 70505 (2007)). 
 68. Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-324, 
§ 1138(a)(5), 110 Stat. 3901 (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903 
(2000 & Supp. V 2005) (current version at 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 70501–70507 
(2007))). 
 69. See United States v. Suerte, 291 F.3d 366, 375 (5th Cir. 2002) (inter-
nal citations omitted); see also United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248–49 
(9th Cir. 1990) (“In order to apply extraterritorially a federal criminal statute 
to a defendant consistent with due process, there must be a sufficient nexus 
between the defendant and the United States.”); United States v. Burke, 540 
F. Supp. 1282, 1288 (D.P.R. 1982) (“Extra-territorial application of penal laws 
is authorized by Article I, Section 8, Clause 10 of the Constitution, which au-
thorizes Congress ‘to define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on 
the high seas, and offenses against the Laws of Nations.’”). 
 70. See, e.g., United States v. Moreno-Morillo, 334 F.3d 819, 824–25 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (holding that drug smuggling in international waters is a “piracy or 
felony within the meaning of Article I, Section 8, Clause 10” without specifying 
whether it is justified by the power over “piracies” or over “felonies”); United 
States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d 1052, 1056 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that 
the MDLEA is justified by Congress’s authority under “Piracies and Felonies” 
clause without specifying whether drug smuggling is either a piracy or felony).  
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B. ENFORCEMENT 
Under standard rules of international law, the Coast 
Guard cannot stop or board foreign vessels on the high seas or 
in foreign waters.71 Thus, the United States has negotiated “bi-
lateral maritime agreements” with twenty-six Caribbean and 
Latin American states since the enactment of the MDLEA.72 
These agreements have been negotiated country by country 
over the past twenty years.73 They set out frameworks for the 
United States to stop, search, and sometimes board the other 
state’s vessels if they are suspected of drug trafficking.74 The 
agreements coordinate numerous technical and tactical aspects 
of joint counter-narcotics enforcement, including the “shiprider” 
program, where a law enforcement officer from one country 
embarks on the other’s vessels, carrying the authority to board 
and make arrests in the name of his home state.75 The agree-
ments generally follow a standard six-part form apparently 
drafted by U.S. officials.76 However, the particular arrange-
ment with each country often varies somewhat from the basic 
template, depending on particular local concern.77 
 
 71. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 110, Nov. 
16, 1994, 1833 U.N.T.S. 438 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
 72. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF INT’L NARCOTICS AND LAW EN-
FORCEMENT AFFAIRS, INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT, March 
2007, available at http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2007/vol1/html/80853 
.htm [hereinafter STATE DEP’T REPORT]. Only a few nations in the area, such 
as Ecuador and Cuba, have not signed such an agreement. U.S. GEN. AC-
COUNTING OFFICE, DRUG CONTROL: UPDATE ON U.S. INTERDICTION EFFORTS 
IN THE CARIBBEAN AND EASTERN PACIFIC 16 (1997) (“There are 12 countries in 
the region with which the United States currently has no formal counterdrug 
agreements. These include . . . Cuba . . . [and] Ecuador . . . .”). 
 73. See STATE DEP’T REPORT, supra note 72. 
 74. See, e.g., United States v. Perlaza, 439 F.3d 1149, 1168 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(stating that seizure of a vessel is allowed pursuant to the Colombian Gov-
ernment’s consent under the Bilateral Agreement); see also Marian Nash 
Leich, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International 
Law, 76 AM. J. INT’L L. 374, 377–79 (1982) (explaining the U.S.-U.K. Agree-
ment on Vessels Trafficking in Drugs). 
 75. Agreement Concerning Cooperation for the Suppression of Illicit Mari-
time Traffic in Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, with Implement-
ing Agreement, U.S.-Hond., art IV, Mar. 29, 2000, Temp. State Dep’t No. 02-4, 
2000 U.S.T. LEXIS 159 [hereinafter U.S.-Hond. Agreement]. 
 76. See International Law: The Importance of Extradition: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Res. of the H. 
Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 106th Cong. 79–80 (1999) (statement of Ernest R. 
Riutta, Rear Admiral, Dep’t of Transp., U.S. Coast Guard) [hereinafter State-
ment of Admiral Riutta]. 
 77. See id. 
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The agreements primarily provide a framework for the 
United States to interdict and potentially seize foreign vessels, 
in coordination and with the approval of the flag state.78 They 
do not address prosecution of the crew in any detail.79 The typi-
cal agreement contains a clause that reserves primary jurisdic-
tion over the vessel and crew to the flag state, while noting that 
the flag state could later choose to waive jurisdiction in favor of 
the United States.80 Of course, the flag state could authorize 
U.S. prosecution even in the absence of an agreement saying 
that they might do so. These clauses make clear that no auto-
matic or ex ante authorization to prosecute should be inferred 
from the boarding and seizure provisions. Some of the agree-
ments make this point explicitly.81 
The MDLEA has quietly become the largest font of univer-
sal jurisdiction in U.S. courts, dwarfing the more high-profile 
Alien Tort Statute litigation. Indeed, the MDLEA appears to be 
the only statute under which the United States asserts univer-
sal criminal jurisdiction.82 The practical consequences are sig-
nificant. Prosecutions under the MDLEA often involve a ves-
sel’s entire crew.83 Given the large quantities of drugs on these 
vessels, these foreigners, captured on foreign vessels in inter-
national waters, can face decades in federal prison.84 This is 
 
 78. Id. at 77 (“The operational goal of these regional agreements is to 
streamline the lengthy diplomatic process required to obtain flag state author-
ity for law enforcement actions against foreign suspect vessels on the high 
seas.”). 
 79. Cf. id. at 76–82. 
 80. U.S.-Hond. Agreement, supra note 75, art. VII(1).  
 81. See, e.g., Agreement U.S.-Jam. Concerning Cooperation in Suppress-
ing Illicit Maritime Drug Trafficking, U.S.-Jam., art. 3(5), May 6, 1997, 1997 
U.S.T. LEXIS 21 [hereinafter U.S.-Jam. Agreement], available at http://www 
.caricom.org/jsp/secretariat/legal_instruments/ 
agreement_jamaica_us_drugtraffic.jsp?menu=secretariat (“Nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed as a waiver by a Party of its right to exercise 
jurisdiction over its nationals.”); Agreement U.S.-Barb. Concerning Co-
operation in Suppressing Illicit Maritime Drug Trafficking, U.S.-Barb., art. 
15(2), June 25, 1997, 1997 U.S.T. LEXIS 5 [hereinafter U.S.-Barb. Agreement] 
(“Nothing . . . [in the agreement] shall be construed as authority for one Party 
to enforce its laws against nationals of the other Party.”). 
 82. See CHARLES DOYLE, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, EXTRATERRITORIAL 
APPLICATION OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW 18 (2006) (“The Maritime Drug 
Law Enforcement Act . . . is somewhat unusual in that it authorizes extrater-
ritorial coverage of federal criminal law . . . .”). 
 83. See United States v. Humphries-Brant, 190 F. App’x 837, 839–40 
(11th Cir. 2006) (affirming denial of a minor participant sentence reduction to 
the 135-month sentence of a simple crew member). 
 84. See, e.g., United States v. Vilches-Navarrete, 523 F.3d 1, 32 (1st Cir. 
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despite the fact that these individuals potentially never have 
set foot in, or directed their activities towards, the United 
States. The exact number of UJ prosecutions under the 
MDLEA is uncertain, though it is probably at least several doz-
en.85  
C. MDLEA IN THE COURTS 
The MDLEA has been subject to a wide variety of largely 
unsuccessful legal challenges.86 However, no published opinion 
deals squarely with the question of Congress’s Article I power 
over purely foreign “Felonies.” 
1. Due Process Issues 
Constitutional challenges to the MDLEA have focused on 
due process.87 Defendants argue that the Fifth Amendment re-
quires they have some “nexus” or factual connection with the 
prosecuting forum.88 This would rule out UJ, which is defined 
by the lack of such a nexus. But this nexus argument is framed 
 
2008) (holding that the defendant’s 365-month sentence was reasonable); Te-
norio v. United States, No. 8:03-CV-2558-T-30MSS, 2006 WL 1428469, at *3 
(M.D. Fla., May 17, 2006) (affirming defendant’s 360-month and 252-month 
sentences). 
 85. A precise tabulation of UJ cases is difficult because the statute applies 
to both UJ situations and those where the vessel has an American crew, desti-
nation, or other nexus. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(c) (2000 & Supp. V 2005) 
(current version at 46 U.S.C.A. § 70502(c) (2007)). There are, however, some 
suggestive data. The Coast Guard arrests roughly 200 people per year in drug 
seizures. See OFFICE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
U.S. COAST GUARD, COAST GUARD DRUG REMOVAL STATISTICS (2008) availa-
ble at http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg531/Drugs/stats.asp. In one recent year, 
199 people were arrested on Colombian vessels or waters alone. Id. It is doubt-
ful that all the arrestees would ultimately be tried in the United States. See 
Plan Colombia: Major Successes and New Challenges: Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on International Relations, 109th Cong. 53 (2005) (statement of Ralph 
D. Utley, RADM (Ret.), Acting Counternarcotics Officer and Interdiction 
Coordinator, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.). District court cases in the Westlaw 
databases show roughly 20 UJ cases annually in recent years, and some cases 
involve multiple defendants. Of course, there are many more UJ prosecutions, 
since defendants, as in other criminal cases, generally plead guilty and waive 
appeals, or otherwise have their cases decided without a published opinion. Cf. 
Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vi-
sion in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 329 (noting that the trend to-
ward resolving cases through guilty pleas in state and federal courts is in-
creasing). 
 86. See DOYLE, supra note 82, at 19. 
 87. See, e.g., United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1101,1111–12 (11th 
Cir. 2002).  
 88. See, e.g., id. at 1111–12.  
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in terms of individual rights rather than the Article I limits.89 
Most courts of appeals (including the Eleventh Circuit, which 
gets most MDLEA cases)90 have held that the Fifth Amend-
ment requires no nexus.91 The Ninth Circuit, on the other 
hand, requires some nexus with the United States.92 Courts 
that do not require a nexus argue that any due process re-
quirement is waived by the consent given by the defendant’s 
home state,93 which is routine in MDLEA cases.94 This high-
lights an important difference in whether a nexus requirement 
is located in the Fifth Amendment or in Article I limits on Con-
gress’s legislative power. Structural limits—unlike personal 
rights—cannot be waived by individual defendants, to say noth-
ing of foreign nations. 
2. Article I Issues 
The question of whether the MDLEA exceeds Congress’s 
Article I limits has not been fully addressed by any court.95 
However, in the past few years some defendants have begun to 
point to a pair of early nineteenth-century Supreme Court cas-
es—United States v. Palmer96 and United States v. Furlong97 as 
indicating limits on UJ under the Felonies power.98 These ar-
 
 89. See id. at 1110 n.21. 
 90. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 776 F.2d 931, 938, 940–41 (11th 
Cir. 1985). 
 91. Id. 
 92. United States v. Perlaza, 439 F.3d 1149, 1160–61 & n.14 (9th Cir. 
2006).  
 93. United States v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548, 553 (1st Cir. 1999); United 
States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d 1052, 1056 (3d Cir. 1993). But see United 
States v. Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d 1249, 1255–57 (9th Cir. 1998) (requir-
ing for Fifth Amendment purposes evidence that drugs were bound for the 
United States, even when home country consented to prosecution). 
 94. United States v. Rodriguez-Duran, 507 F.3d, 749, 757 n.9 (1st Cir. 
2007) (describing the processes for obtaining foreign state consent). 
 95. United States v. Madera-Lopez, 190 F. App’x 832, 835 (11th Cir. 2006) 
(“[T]here is no precedent from either the Supreme Court or this Court resolv-
ing the issue of whether the MDLEA’s enactment exceeded Congress’s author-
ity under the ‘Piracies and Felonies Clause.’”). 
 96. United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 (1818). 
 97. United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184 (1820). 
 98. See, e.g., Appellant’s Initial Brief at 3, United States v. Garcia, 182 F. 
App’x 873 (11th Cir. 2006) (No. 05-10666-HH). The author of this Article par-
ticipated in drafting the first of these defense motions. Though unsuccessful, 
the argument was quickly echoed by other defendants, though usually not in a 
timely manner, and thus received only perfunctory attention from the courts. 
While the position developed in this Article and the companion piece grew out 
of the original motion to dismiss in Garcia, the argument presented here in-
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guments have usually been raised in a cursory manner, usually 
for the first time on appeal and thus have faced an uphill battle 
under a plain error standard.99 The Eleventh Circuit has de-
nied such appeals with almost no discussion, simply noting that 
other courts have found the MDLEA to be an exercise of the Pi-
racies and Felonies power.100 However, those cases simply cited 
the clause, and did not discuss the issue of its limits.101  
To the extent courts have considered arguments from the 
Piracies and Felonies Clause, they misread Palmer and Fur-
long as purely statutory cases about the scope of the 1790 
Crimes Act,102 or as based on international rather than consti-
tutional law principles.103 Furthermore, litigants only began to 
mention the Define and Punish Clause after most courts had 
ruled that the Fifth Amendment does not require a nexus in 
MDLEA cases.104 Thus judges mistakenly saw the Felonies ar-
gument as simply a repleading of the oft-rejected nexus argu-
ment, and treated it is as a matter of stare decisis.105 This con-
 
volves far more extensive evidence and analysis, most of it never considered by 
any court. The conclusions here are also, in some ways, different from those 
positions advanced in Garcia. 
 99. See, e.g., Madera-Lopez, 190 F. App’x at 836 (holding that the district 
court did not plainly err). 
 100. See, e.g., Garcia, 182 F. App’x at 876 (noting that other circuits have 
found the MDLEA to be constitutional). 
 101. Compare id. at 876 (“[W]hile there is little case law interpreting the 
scope of the High Seas Clause, other circuits have upheld the constitutionality 
of the MDLEA. . . . [w]ithout specifically discussing the High Seas Clause’s 
limits . . . .”), with Madera-Lopez, 190 F. App’x at 835 n.1 (recognizing that 
cases cited in Garcia “did not discuss the limits of Congress’s authority under 
the Piracies and Felonies Clause”). Even less persuasively, the court in United 
States v. Suerte took the astonishing step of refusing to follow Furlong based 
on a notion that it “may be at loggerheads, however, with more recent pro-
nouncements by the Court.” United States v. Suerte, 291 F.3d 366, 374 (5th 
Cir. 2002). Of the two “pronouncements” relied on by Suerte, one is a dissent, 
and the other a dictum that does not deal with the Define and Punish Clause 
at all. See id. 
 102. Madera-Lopez, 190 F. App’x at 836 (holding that because Furlong did 
not specifically “hold that Congress exceeded its authority under the Pirates 
and Felonies Clause by seeking to regulate drug trafficking on the high seas,” 
the district court did not err by failing to declare the MDLEA unconstitution-
al). 
 103. See Suerte, 291 F.3d at 374. 
 104. See id. at 375.  
 105. See United States v. Estupinan, 453 F.3d 1336, 1338 (11th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that the district court did not err in failing to strike down the 
MDLEA sua sponte as exceeding Congress’s Define and Punish power because 
the circuit has not previously “embellished” the MDLEA with a nexus re-
quirement); Garcia, 182 F. App’x at 876 (citing Fifth Amendment cases and 
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flates inquiries based on two totally different provisions—the 
Fifth Amendment and the Define and Punish Clause.106 That 
the Fifth Amendment does not require a nexus says nothing 
about the logically prior question of whether Congress has the 
power to legislate absent a nexus.  
As the next Part will show, there is good reason to believe 
that much of the MDLEA’s UJ application exceeds Congress’s 
Article I limits. This was indeed recognized by the Marshall 
Court in Palmer and Furlong, as a close reading of those cases 
suggests. It is also corroborated by a wide range of other evi-
dence not yet considered by any court in an MDLEA case: 
strong statements made by Justices James Wilson and Joseph 
Story in their grand jury instructions, John Marshall’s famous 
House of Representatives speech in the Thomas Nash affair, 
and Congress’s decision that it could not extend UJ to the slave 
trade before it had become universally cognizable in interna-
tional law. Nor have courts considered the lessons that might 
be learned from the drafting history and purposes of the clause.  
Indeed, judicial discussions of the Piracies and Felonies 
power treat these “parallel provisions within the same constitu-
tional clause” as having the same scope.107 This renders “Pira-
cies” entirely redundant: all piracies are felonies. As the next 
Part will show, piracy was different from all other felonies in 
one crucial way: it was universally cognizable. The separate 
enumeration of piracy suggests that its unique jurisdictional 
trait applies only to it, and not to other felonies on the high 
seas. 
II.  “PIRACIES AND FELONIES” AND THE LIMITS ON 
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION   
Congress has only those powers given to it.108 The question 
raised by the MDLEA is whether the Define and Punish 
Clause, and in particular its provision for “Piracies and Felo-
 
noting that the court has “previously rejected the argument that the MDLEA 
is unconstitutional because the conduct at issue lacks a nexus to the United 
States”). 
 106. See Suerte, 291 F.3d at 374–75 (“The opinions addressing the reach of 
the 1790 Act are of significance to our consideration of the MDLEA’s reach 
[under the Fifth Amendment].”). 
 107. See id. at 374 (observing in an MDLEA case that since piracy can be 
punished with no U.S. nexus, this “should apply with equal weight to felonies 
such as at issue here”). 
 108. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).  
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nies committed on the high Seas,”109 is an open-ended authori-
zation for Congress to punish any crimes on the high seas and 
any offenses against the law of nations, regardless of whether 
they have a connection with the United States. The companion 
Article, The “Define and Punish” Clause and the Limits of Uni-
versal Jurisdiction, shows that while “Piracies” can be pu-
nished without regard to nexus, “Felonies” and “Offences” re-
quire a direct connection to the United States.110 Thus while 
assaults on ambassadors were paradigmatic violations of the 
law of nations, an attack on the Fijian ambassador to Vanuatu 
by a citizen of the latter would not fall within Congress’s power 
over “Offences.” Similarly, while rape is a felony, when commit-
ted among Vanuatuans on one of their national vessels, it 
would not fall within Congress’s “Felonies” power.  
The companion Article shows the limits of the Define and 
Punish Clause by examining its historical sources, text, ratifi-
cation, and purposes, as well as the views taken by the courts, 
the executive branch, and Congress during the early Republic—
the last time the jurisdictional scope of the clause was an issue. 
The full analysis shall not be reprised here. Rather, this Part 
summarizes the main lines of evidence suggesting that Con-
gress’s power over “Felonies” and “Offences” as being limited to 
offenses with some connection to the United States, unlike the 
power over “Piracies.”111 Even if the evidence for this proposi-
tion as an original matter is not entirely compelling, its adop-
tion by figures such as James Wilson, and by the Supreme 
Court under John Marshall should, as a practical matter, make 
it hard for a court today to take a different approach to such an 
obscure and poorly documented provision.  
It bears stressing that the argument is not that Congress is 
directly bound by international law.112 Rather, the Define and 
Punish Clause, by using various terms of art drawn from cus-
 
 109. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
 110. See Kontorovich, supra note 17, at 159–68.  
 111. The companion article explores these sources in greater detail and 
considers potential objections, methodological questions, and a few pieces of 
inconsistent evidence.  
 112. United States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d 1052, 1056 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(“Congress may override international law by clearly expressing its intent to 
do so.”); United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(“It is well-established that Congress has the power to override international 
law.”); cf. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 
(1804) (observing that statutes will not be construed to contradict internation-
al law absent clear congressional intent). 
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tomary international law, requires an interpreter to consult 
that body of law to define those terms. 
A. THE DRAFTING OF THE CLAUSE AND THE LEGAL 
BACKGROUND 
The Define and Punish Clause received little “serious” dis-
cussion at the Philadelphia Convention or during ratifica-
tion.113 Yet on its face, the clause requires further analysis, as 
it contains a striking double redundancy. Piracy is a subspecies 
of felony.114 Moreover, piracy has long been an offense against 
the law of nations.115 Constitutional construction disfavors 
readings that render certain provisions superfluous.116 Indeed, 
Justice Story insisted that other potentially overlapping words 
in the Define and Punish Clause should bear separate mean-
ings.117 A double redundancy begs the question whether any-
thing distinguishes piracy both from other felonies and from 
other law of nations crimes. Such a difference would likely be 
the reason that the Constitution mentions piracy separately.  
One major difference existed between piracy and the other 
powers listed in the Define and Punish Clause. Piracy was the 
only UJ offense at the time of the Framing (and up until recent 
decades).118 The definition of piracy in international law was 
narrow, specific, and undisputed: robbery on the high seas.119 
Piracy and its notorious UJ status (referred to at the time as 
hostis humani generis, enemy of all mankind), were congruent, 
almost synonymous.120 
 
 113. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 1165 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., Little, Brown, & Co. 1891) 
(1833). 
 114. See WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA 107 (2d ed. 1829) (“Felony . . . when committed on the 
high seas, amounts to piracy.”). 
 115. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *68, *71 (observing that 
piracy is both a felony under English law and an offense against the law of na-
tions); THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (James Madison). 
 116. See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 391 (1821) (ar-
guing against a suggested interpretation of Constitution that would render 
another provision “mere surplusage”).  
 117. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 158 (1820). 
 118. See United States v. Robins, 27 F. Cas. 825, 862 (D.S.C. 1799) (No. 
16,175) (“Piracy under the law of nations . . . alone is punishable by all na-
tions . . . .” (emphasis added)); Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 159–60 
(1795) (“[A]ll piracies and trespasses committed against the general law of na-
tions, are inquirable, and may be proceeded against, in any nation . . . .”).  
 119. See Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 161–62. 
 120. HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 124 (George 
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However, in addition to piracy under the law of nations, 
each nation could make diverse offenses “municipal” or “statu-
tory” piracies.121 Such statutory piracy could only be punished 
within the particular state’s municipal jurisdiction.122 As 
Wheaton, the American diplomat, reporter of Supreme Court 
decisions, and author of the leading early nineteenth-century 
American treatise on international law, put it: “piracy created 
by municipal statute [could] only be punished by that State 
within whose territorial jurisdiction, and “on board whose ves-
sels, the offence thus created was committed.”123 The distinc-
tion between “municipal” and “international” or true piracy ob-
viously tracks the constitutional distinction between felonies 
and piracies. It suggests that Congress can punish piracy con-
sistent with its UJ status, but that that power should not spill 
over to felonies.  
B. EARLY INTERPRETATIONS 
With one exception, Congress did not use the Piracies and 
Felonies power to legislate universally over anything except pi-
racy until the MDLEA. The first Congress exercised the Pira-
cies and Felonies power when it enacted the first criminal sta-
tute in 1790.124 It purported to criminalize “murder or robbery” 
when committed by “any person” on the high seas.125 The sec-
 
Grafton Wilson ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1936) (1836).  
 121. See id. 
 122. Id.  
 123. Id. 
 124. ALFRED P. RUBIN, ETHICS AND AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 85 
(1997). 
 125. Section 8 of the statute provided that: 
[I]f any person or persons shall commit upon the high seas, or in any 
river, haven, basin or bay, out of the jurisdiction of any particular 
state, murder or robbery, or any other offence which if committed 
within the body of a county, would by the laws of the United States be 
punishable with death; or if any captain or mariner of any ship or 
other vessel, shall piratically and feloniously run away with such ship 
or vessel, or any goods or merchandise to the value of fifty dollars, or 
yield up such ship or vessel voluntarily to any pirate; or if any sea-
man shall lay violent hands upon his commander, thereby to hinder 
and prevent his fighting in defence of his ship or goods committed to 
his trust, or shall make a revolt in the ship; every such offender shall 
be deemed, taken and adjudged to be a pirate and felon, and being 
thereof convicted shall suffer death: and the trial of crimes committed 
on the high seas, or in any place out of the jurisdiction of any particu-
lar state, shall be in the district where the offender is apprehended, or 
into which he may first be brought. 
Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 8, 1 Stat. 112, 113–14 (1790) (emphasis added).  
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tion also proclaimed that “any person” shall be punished for a 
variety of maritime misdeeds, such as “running away with a 
vessel,” revolt, assaulting commanders,126 and attempts and 
conspiracies to do those things.127 Robbery on the high seas 
was, of course, the international law crime of piracy, or “gener-
al” piracy.128 But the other offenses that the statute dubbed “pi-
racy” were made punishable when committed by “any person,” 
without restriction.129 A literal reading would extend U.S. legis-
lative power universally to a wide variety of major and minor 
crimes aboard any vessel on the high seas,130 and even to some 
ancillary offenses on land.131 
The constitutionality of punishing “all persons” for any-
thing other than international piracy was immediately called 
into doubt by Justice James Wilson,132 a member of the consti-
tutional convention and subsequent state ratification process, 
as well as a Justice on the first Supreme Court.133 Instructing a 
grand jury, Wilson noted the well-known distinction between 
general piracy and other maritime crimes that a nation may 
penalize.134 This distinction exists regardless of whether the 
latter are dubbed “piracies” by statute.135 If Congress intended 
the murder provision to apply to foreigners on foreign vessels, 
it would be unconstitutional.136  
Similarly, John Marshall, while a congressman from Vir-
ginia, attacked the constitutionality of the statue during his 
famous speech on the House floor in the affair of Jonathan 
Robbins.137 First, he argued that the idea that Congress’s pow-
 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. § 10. 
 128. Id. § 8 (“[I]f any person or persons shall commit upon the high seas . . . 
robbery . . . such offender shall be deemed, taken and adjudged to be a pi-
rate.”); see RUBIN, supra note 124, at 72 (stating that piracy was considered 
unquestionably to be “under the 1787 conception of the ‘law of nations’”). 
 129. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 8, 1 Stat. 112, 113–14. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. § 10. 
 132. Hon. James Wilson, A Charge to the Grand Jury in the Circuit Court 
of the United States, for the District of Virginia, in May 1791, in 2 THE WORKS 
OF JAMES WILSON 803, 813 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967). 
 133. Robert Green McCloskey, Introduction to 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES 
WILSON 1, 2 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967). 
 134. Wilson, supra note 132, at 813. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 813–14 (expressing his “doubts concerning” that the extension of 
the murder provisions to foreigners is consistent with the law of nations). 
 137. Hon. John Marshall, Speech Delivered in the House of Representa-
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er to punish felonies on the high seas was unlimited would lead 
to consequences too absurd to accept.138 Could the United 
States punish desertion by British seamen from a British ves-
sel to a French one, or pick-pocketing among British sailors?139 
Such a general jurisdiction over high seas offenses had never 
been suggested, and certainly could never have been intended 
by those who drafted and ratified it.140 If the text does not ex-
pressly forbid UJ, Marshall argued, it is only because it was too 
silly for the Framers to have contemplated.141  
Moreover, even if Congress for some reason wanted to le-
gislate for purely foreign causes, it could not: “Any general ex-
pression in a legislative act, must, necessarily be restrained to 
objects within the jurisdiction of the legislature passing the 
act.”142 Thus if the Crimes Act attempted to attach UJ to any-
thing but piracy, it would go too far, regardless of any findings 
or statements by the legislature.  
[T]hat [Define and Punish] clause can never be construed to make to 
the government a grant of power, which the people making it did not 
themselves possess. It has already been shown that the people of the 
United States have no jurisdiction over offences, committed on board 
a foreign ship, against a foreign nation. Of consequence, in framing a 
government for themselves, they cannot have passed this jurisdiction 
to that government. The law [the Crimes Act], therefore, cannot act 
upon the case. But this clause of the constitution cannot be considered 
and need not be considered, as affecting acts which are piracy under 
the law of nations.143 
Thus both Marshall and Wilson doubted that Congress 
could have constitutionally extended UJ to anything but piracy, 
which was the only offense universally cognizable under the 
law of nations.  
C. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENTS 
The Supreme Court did not confront the question until 
nearly two decades later, in United States v. Palmer.144 The 
case was a classic international law piracy—the armed robbery 
 
tives, in 4 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 95–96 (Charles T. Cullen & Leslie 
Tobias eds., 1984). 
 138. Id. at 86. 
 139. See id. 
 140. Id. at 92–93, 96.  
 141. See id. at 102. 
 142. Id. at 91. 
 143. Id. at 96 (emphasis added). 
 144. 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 (1818). 
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of a Spanish vessel by a foreign defendant.145 The Court held 
that while Congress could constitutionally extend UJ to ge-
nuine piracies,146 the 1790 Act had not done so.147 This conclu-
sion was surprising given the statute’s capacious language of 
“any person”—the same language used in the MDLEA.148 
Moreover, it went against what was generally perceived as 
Congress’s goal in passing the statute—to punish piracy to the 
same extent all other nations do, namely, universally.149 Mar-
shall’s reasoning followed the same lines he had laid down 
twenty years earlier in the Robbins’ affair.150 The statute must 
be interpreted non-literally even in the case of piracy, because 
if “any person” were read literally, it would be quite problemat-
ic to apply to all the non-piratical offenses listed in the sta-
tute.151  
Because of the narrowing construction, Marshall did not 
have to directly express the constitutional issue of the limits on 
legislative power.152 But the arguments for reading the statute 
narrowly in Palmer were the same ones he had used in the 
House to explain why a broad reading would be unconstitution-
al.153 Moreover, the U.S. Attorney, arguing for a broad scope for 
the law, conceded it could not constitutionally apply universally 
to non-piratical offenses,154 and Justice Johnson wrote sepa-
 
 145. Id. at 611. 
 146. Id. at 630. 
 147. Id. at 633–34.  
 148. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(a) (2000) (current version at 46 U.S.C.A. 
§ 70505 (2007). 
 149. John Quincy Adams, Diary Entry (May 13, 1819), in 4 MEMOIRS OF 
JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 363 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1875). Indeed, Con-
gress promptly passed a new statute to provide clear authorization for piracy 
UJ. See Act of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 77, § 5, 3 Stat. 510, 513–14 (1819) (clarifying 
intent to assert UJ over piracy through language stating “[t]hat if any person 
or persons whatsoever, shall, on the high seas, commit the crime of piracy, as 
defined by the law of nations . . . .” (emphasis added)). See generally United 
States v. Chapels, 25 F. Cas. 399, 399 (D. Va. 1819) (No. 14,782) (discussing 
background to the 1819 Act). 
 150. Compare Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 630; with Marshall, supra note 
137, at 91. 
 151. Marshall, supra note 137, at 95–96.  
 152. See Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 630–31 (“[T]here can be no doubt of 
the right of the legislature to enact laws punishing pirates . . . . The only ques-
tion is, has the legislature enacted such a law?”).  
 153. Compare id. at 633, with Marshall, supra note 137, at 95–96. 
 154. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 618. 
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rately to stress what was just below the surface in Marshall’s 
opinion.155  
Two years later a unanimous Court reaffirmed that Con-
gress could not punish the murder of a foreigner by a foreigner 
on a foreign vessel in United States v. Furlong.156 Such a case 
was one in which Congress “ha[s] no right to interfere.”157 The 
Furlong Court made clear that that this limitation was not one 
found in international law, or due process, or the statute it-
self.158 Rather, it was found in the difference between “Piracies” 
and “Felonies” in the Define and Punish Clause.159 As the 
Court put it, UJ in such a case would go beyond the “the pu-
nishing powers of the body that enacted” the law.160 The Court 
went on to distinguish between piracies at international law 
and other crimes.161 Murder, when it involves only foreigners 
abroad, is a matter in which Congress “ha[s] no right to inter-
fere”;162 on the other hand, piracy under identical circums-
tances falls within the “acknowledged reach of the punishing 
power of Congress.”163 
The Court’s distinction between piracy and murder precise-
ly tracks the “Piracies and Felonies” distinction: 
[T]here exist well-known distinctions between the crimes of piracy 
and murder, both as to constituents and incidents. Robbery on the 
seas is considered as an offence within the criminal jurisdiction of all 
nations. . . . Not so with the crime of murder. It is an offence too ab-
horrent to the feelings of man, to have made it necessary that it also 
should have been brought within this universal jurisdiction. And 
hence, punishing it when committed within the jurisdiction, or, (what 
is the same thing,) in the vessel of another nation, has not been ac-
knowledged as a right . . . .164 
The “constituents” of the crimes are their elements—the 
substantive conduct. The “incidents” are the rules regarding 
their punishment. Furlong makes two points. First, Congress 
 
 155. Id. at 641–42 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (“Congress can inflict punish-
ment on offences committed on board the vessels of the United States, or by 
citizens of the United States, any where; but congress cannot make that piracy 
which is not piracy by the law of nations, in order to give jurisdiction to its own 
courts over such offences.” (emphasis added)). 
 156. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 197 (1820). 
 157. Id. at 198. 
 158. Id. at 194–95.  
 159. Id. at 195–96.  
 160. Id. at 196 (emphasis added). 
 161. Id. at 196–97.  
 162. Id. at 198.  
 163. Id. at 197. 
 164. Id. at 196–97 (emphasis added). 
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does not have power to define the “constituents” of offenses 
without regard to the definition under international law.165 
And, more pertinently for present purposes, it cannot apply the 
“incidents” of piracy to something that does not have that sta-
tus.166 Of course, the only “incident” of piracy that it did not 
share with murder was its UJ status.167  
The test of what Congress can make universally cognizable 
is the law of nations; Congress cannot expand its jurisdiction by 
calling crimes piracies when they do not have such a status in 
international law.168 Piracy and murder “are things so essen-
tially different in their nature, that not even the omnipotence of 
legislative power can confound or identify them.”169 It would be 
hard to find clearer language expressing the view that this lim-
it is inherent and nonderogable.170 
C. CONGRESSIONAL RESTRAINT 
In the early 1800s, the United States and Europe began 
taking measures to ban the transatlantic slave trade.171 A 
growing number of nations banned the trade and a series of in-
ternational congresses decried it as an abomination.172 In 1820 
Congress went further than any other nation had ever gone be-
fore by declaring the slave trade a form of piracy punishable by 
 
 165. Id. at 197. 
 166. Id.  
 167. Id.  
 168. Id.  
 169. Id. at 198 (emphasis added). 
 170. A. Mark Weisburd, Due Process Limits on Federal Extraterritorial 
Legislation?, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 379, 420 (1997) (stating that the 
Court believes Congress cannot punish crimes that are not under UJ in inter-
national law). 
 171. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 76 (1825). 
 172. See, e.g., Treaty of Ghent, U.S.-G.B., art. X, Dec. 24, 1814, 3 Stat. 218, 
223 (“Whereas the traffic in slaves is irreconcilable with the principles of hu-
manity and justice, and whereas both his Majesty and the United States are 
desirous of continuing their efforts to promote its entire abolition, it is hereby 
agreed that both the contracting parties shall use their best endeavors to ac-
complish so desirable an object.”); Congress at Vienna, Declaration of the Pow-
ers on the Abolition of the Slave Trade, Feb. 18, 1815, reprinted in 1 
HERTSLET’S COMMERCIAL TREATIES 11 (Lewis Hertslet ed., 1840) (declaring 
the slave trade to be “repugnant to the principles of humanity and universal 
morality”); Declaration of the Congress of Verona, Relative to the Abolition of 
the Slave Trade, Nov. 28, 1822, reprinted in 3 HERTSLET’S COMMERCIAL 
TREATIES 2–3 (Lewis Hertslet ed., 1841) (announcing the powers’ commitment 
to wiping out slave trade); see also WHEATON, supra note 120, §§ 125–126, at 
165–69; The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) app. at 27 (1825) (describing Euro-
pean measures against slave trade). 
 1216 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [93:1191 
 
death.173 The statute applied to  
any citizen of the United States, being of the crew or ship’s company 
of any foreign ship or vessel engaged in the slave trade, or any person 
whatever, being of the crew or ship’s company of any ship or vessel, 
owned in the whole or part, or navigated for, or in behalf of, any citi-
zen or citizens of the United States.174 
In other words, Congress extended jurisdiction just short of 
UJ, but no further. While the Act cast the jurisdictional net 
broadly, and dubbed the trade piratical, Congress chose to only 
punish the conduct to the extent it had a demonstrable U.S. 
nexus.175 
The legislative history makes clear that Congress would 
have liked to punish the trade without any regard to a U.S. 
nexus. Congress wanted to eliminate the trade itself, not just 
U.S. involvement, which had already been criminalized by ear-
lier laws.176 But slave trading was at the time clearly not a vi-
olation of international law and not recognized as universally 
cognizable.177  
The report on the bill from the House Committee on the 
Slave Trade makes clear that Congress limited the reach of the 
Act because of concerns about the limits of its Piracies and Fe-
lonies power.178 In explaining why the law only punished of-
fenses with an American connection, the House Report ex-
plained that “the Constitutional power of the Government has 
 
 173. An Act to continue in force “An act to protect the commerce of the 
United States, and punish the crime of piracy,” and also to make further pro-
visions for punishing the crime of piracy, ch. 113, §§ 4–5, 3 Stat. 600, 600–01 
(1820). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Many of the cases brought under the Act revolved around whether ei-
ther the citizenship or ownership requirements were satisfied. See, e.g., United 
States v. Gordon, 25 F. Cas. 1364, 1365 (S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 15,231). Before 
passports, when much of the U.S. population were first or second generation 
immigrants, determining a defendant’s nationality was not easy, especially if 
he wished to obscure it. See id. at 1365 (relying on scant evidence and wit-
nesses to determine defendant’s citizenship). Similarly, slave traders resorted 
to a variety of measures, like fictitious sales and renaming, to throw off their 
American connection. Id. at 1366. As an element of the offense, the United 
States had to prove the jurisdictional requirements, and thus defendants re-
lied heavily on this point. Id. at 1365. 
 176. James Monroe, Message to the Senate, May 21, 1824, in 3 JOURNAL 
OF THE EXECUTIVE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE 381 (1828) (stating that 
through prior laws Congress demonstrated that it wanted other nations to 
seek the abolition of the slave trade). 
 177. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 90; Monroe, supra note 176, at 
381; WHEATON, supra note 120, § 125, at 165–67.  
 178. 36 ANNALS OF CONG. 2210 (1820). 
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already been exercised . . . in defining the crime of piracy” as 
far as it can go given that the slave trade had yet to become un-
iversally cognizable: “Such is the unavoidable consequence of 
any exercise of the authority of Congress, to define and punish 
this crime. The definition and punishment can bind the United 
States alone.”179 
Thus in the Act of 1820, the United States acted “only “in 
relation to themselves,” understanding that “they were bound 
by the injunction of their constitution to execute it, so far as re-
spects the punishment of their own citizens . . . .”180 Congress’s 
view of its power over non-UJ felonies as jurisdictionally li-
mited strongly corroborates the understanding suggested by 
the separate mention of piracies and felonies, views expressed 
by the Framers, influential interpreters such as Marshall and 
Story, and by Supreme Court dicta. Indeed, as a statement 
against interest—limiting its own power—Congress’s inaction 
in 1820 may carry additional interpretive weight. 
III.  THE MDLEA EXCEEDS THE DEFINE AND PUNISH 
CLAUSE’S LIMITS   
Congress cannot attach the jurisdictional consequences of 
piracies to felonies.181 This raises the question of whether drug 
trafficking is a piracy or felony. It obviously does not fit within 
the traditional definition of piracy as “robbery, when committed 
upon the sea,”182 or even the more modern definition of “acts of 
violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for 
private ends” aboard a vessel.183  
However, the Define and Punish Clause’s limitation of UJ 
to piracy can be understood in one of two ways. The textual or 
originalist understanding would be that piracy is the one and 
only offense which Congress can ever punish without a U.S. 
 
 179. Id. (emphasis added). 
 180. HENRY WHEATON, ENQUIRY INTO THE RIGHT OF VISITATION & SEARCH 
OF AMERICAN VESSELS 109–10 (1842) (emphasis added).  
 181. See United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 196–97 (1820) 
(stating that universal criminal jurisdiction over piracy does not extend to 
murder). 
 182. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 162 (1820). 
 183. United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea, art. 101(a), Dec. 
10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 436. The violence or depredation must be “directed . . . 
against” people on the ship or on another ship on the high seas. Operating a 
pirate vessel or facilitating or encouraging piratical acts also counts as piracy. 
Id. art. 101(b)–(c). 
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nexus.184 A broader view would reason that since piracy hap-
pened to be the only UJ offense at the time of the Founding, the 
Clause means to allow Congress to exert UJ over all offenses 
that the contemporary international law treats as universally 
cognizable.185 In the latter view, just as constitutional refer-
ences to “Army” and “Navy”186 are interpreted as tracking ex-
ternal changes in military structure and technology by allowing 
for an independent “Air Force,”187 “piracy” should be unders-
tood as tracking external legal changes.  
Both positions understand the clause to incorporate inter-
national law by reference.188 The difference is whether such in-
corporation is static, locked into the 1789 content of customary 
international law (CIL), or dynamic, expanding and contracting 
to keep up with external changes in international law. This Ar-
ticle takes no position on the “updating” question,189 and will 
consider the implications of both approaches. 
If the constitutional text locks in the 1789 limits on UJ, the 
MDLEA obviously exceeds them. Drug trafficking does not in 
any way resemble piracy. Far from being forcible robbery, it is 
voluntary commerce. It is a “Felony” and thus not universally 
cognizable.190 On the other hand, if the text allows for updat-
ing, the analysis becomes more complex. For the sake of argu-
ment, this Part assumes the Clause as a whole tracks changes 
in international law, and thus “Piracies” encompasses today’s 
UJ offenses. Nonetheless, this Part shows even with updating, 
the MDLEA exceeds the Define and Punish Clause’s limits be-
cause drug trafficking is not a universally recognizable offense. 
This also means that Congress cannot reach the conduct 
through the related power to punish “Offences against the Law 
of Nations.” This part also considers other modern jurisdiction-
al concepts that might authorize some MDLEA prosecutions—
 
 184. RUBIN, supra note 124, at 85. 
 185. Id. 
 186. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cls. 12–14. 
 187. Cf. Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1176 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(“The reference in the Constitution to the Army and Navy is understood to in-
clude the Air Force and other units of the military services.”); Lawrence Les-
sig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1203 (1993) (“[S]ince there 
was no such thing as an air force in 1789, it is absurd to read the gap [in the 
constitutional text] as a proscription.”); Michael Rappaport, Is an Independent 
Air Force Constitutional?, Jan. 30, 2007, http://rightcoast.typepad.com/ 
rightcoast/2007/01/is_an_ independe.html. 
 188. RUBIN, supra note 124, at 92–93.  
 189. Kontorovich, supra note 17, at 199–202. 
 190. See supra Part II.C. 
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protective jurisdiction and statelessness. The latter may be suf-
ficient to save a subset of MDLEA cases, if one proceeds on the 
somewhat untested theory that “piracy” means any high seas 
crime that would be within a state’s jurisdictional reach under 
the international law of the day.  
A. CONGRESSIONAL DISCRETION TO “DEFINE” 
Some might view the grant to Congress of a power to “de-
fine . . . Piracies and . . . Offences”191 as giving it the final say 
on what is a non-UJ felony and what is not. Thus before consi-
dering whether modern CIL provides some basis for the 
MDLEA, this section shows that Congress does not get the first 
and last word on the content of CIL.  
The Define and Punish Clause raises questions about how 
much flexibility Congress has in “defining.”192 Can courts look 
to the law of nations to determine whether Congress has de-
fined a crime that is actually recognized by international law? 
Conversely, is whether something violates the law of nations 
itself a question left entirely to Congress through its power to 
“define”? The word “define” may suggest some latitude for Con-
gress that it is not entirely bound by some external, objectively 
determinable body of international law.  
The history of the provision suggests conflicting answers, 
and the courts have had few occasions to address the question. 
The clause, as it first appeared coming out of the Committee of 
 
 191. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 10. 
 192. Zephyr Rain Teachout, Note, Defining and Punishing Abroad: Consti-
tutional Limits on the Extraterritorial Reach of the Offenses Clause, 48 DUKE 
L.J. 1305, 1305 (1999). The few academic discussions arrive at markedly dif-
ferent answers. Compare Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: 
Congress’s Power to “Define and Punish . . . Offenses Against the Law of Na-
tions,” 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447, 545 (2000) (stating that “in deciding what 
falls within the reach of the Clause, Congress’s decisions are entitled to signif-
icant deference from the judiciary”), and Note, The Offenses Clause After Sosa 
v. Alvarez-Machain, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2378, 2394 (2005) (arguing that the 
“fluid, self-reinforcing character of modern customary international law and 
the role Congress has in shaping international law” requires that in a post-
Erie world Congress not be confined to defining offenses clearly or certainly 
established as violations of international law), with Charles D. Siegal, Defe-
rence and Its Dangers: Congress’ Power To “Define . . . Offenses Against the 
Law of Nations,” 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 865, 879 (1988) (arguing that it 
would “extend the clause too far to permit Congress to use it to define offenses 
without a clear international law basis”), and Teachout, supra, at 1321 (ar-
guing that the purpose of the provision was “to enable Congress to clarify un-
clear international law” rather than “to grant Congress the power to create its 
own version of international law”). 
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Detail, gave Congress the power “to declare the Law and Pu-
nishment of Piracies and Felonies committed on the high 
Seas . . . .”193 Ultimately “define” was substituted for “declare 
the law”194 though with little apparent change in meaning.195 
The spirit of the provision seems to be that felonies and the law 
of nations refer to a broad body of law, external to the Constitu-
tion, whose precise details, elements, and penalties vary.196 
Congress could statutorily provide the requisite specificity to 
allow for certain and uniform punishment.197 The scant evi-
dence from the Framing does not seem to resolve the issue.198 
Few decisions address the question directly.199 However, 
the Court has, from the time of the early Republic, acted as if it 
can review Congress’s definition against the external standard 
of the “Law of Nations.”200 In a similar vein to Marshall’s 1800 
House speech,201 the Court in Furlong, strongly insisted that 
Congress cannot arbitrarily classify something as a felony or 
piracy (i.e., universally cognizable).202 This must depend on its 
status in surrounding law: 
Nor is it any objection to this opinion, that the law [the 1790 Crimes 
Act] declares murder to be piracy. These are things so essentially dif-
ferent in their nature, that not even the omnipotence of legislative 
power can confound or identify them.  . . . If by calling murder piracy, 
 
 193. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 168 (Max 
Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION]. 
 194. Id. at 316. 
 195. Cf. id. (showing that changes in the language did not alter the mean-
ing of the provision). 
 196. See id. (stating that the “common law is vague” on this question).  
 197. See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 159 (1820) (“Of-
fences . . . against the law of nations, cannot . . . be said to be completely ascer-
tained and defined in any public code recognised by the common consent of na-
tions. In respect, therefore, as well to felonies on the high seas as to offences 
against the law of nations, there is a peculiar fitness in giving the power to 
define as well as to punish; and there is not the slightest reason to doubt that 
this consideration had very great weight in producing the phraseology in ques-
tion.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 234 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961). 
 198. Cf. RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 193, at 316 
(showing that there was relatively little debate on this issue).  
 199. Perhaps most recently, in Ex parte Quirin, the Court considered 
whether the charged offenses against the laws of war were in fact violations of 
the law of war. 317 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1942). 
 200. See Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 163 (holding that the statutory of-
fense was piracy, “as defined by the law of nations, so as to be punishable un-
der the act of Congress of the 3d of March, 1819”). 
 201. Marshall, supra note 137, at 95–96. 
 202. United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 198 (1820). 
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it might assert a jurisdiction over that offence committed by a fo-
reigner in a foreign vessel, what offence might not be brought within 
their power by the same device?203 
Perhaps the most discussed case on the subject is United 
States v. Arjona,204 in which the Court upheld a law against 
counterfeiting foreign currency as an exercise of the Offenses 
Clause of the United States Constitution.205 The Court consi-
dered whether the law legitimately fell within the Offenses 
Clause.206 It did not entirely take Congress’s word for it, but ra-
ther looked to international law treatises.207 It found that the 
counterfeiting of currency by individuals was not a violation of 
international law but rather that international law imposed ob-
ligations on nations to prevent their citizens from counterfeit-
ing.208 Therefore, the Court sustained the statute as “necessary 
and proper” for the United States’ compliance with interna-
tional law.209 
Some have suggested that Arjona’s “quick look” at interna-
tional law, and its sustaining of the statute despite finding a 
nexus rather than a tight fit between it and international law, 
provides precedent for a very deferential view of the Offenses 
Clause.210 However, Arjona does not provide groundbreaking 
precedent for the Offenses Clause as the Court saw the primary 
source of congressional power as the Foreign Commerce Clause 
aided by the Necessary and Proper Clause.211 And the Court’s 
casual discussion of international law constantly refers back to 
the great effect such counterfeiting can have on U.S. economic 
relations.212  
The purposes of the Offenses Clause and precedents inter-
preting it provide no support for the view that Congress can en-
tirely invent offenses, or that courts cannot measure exercises 
of the Offenses Clause against the “Law of Nations” as they 
understand it.213 According to Justice Story, the word “define” 
 
 203. Id. at 198. 
 204. 120 U.S. 479, 488 (1887). 
 205. Id. at 483 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10).  
 206. Id. at 488. 
 207. Id. at 484–87. 
 208. Id. at 483 (“The national government is . . . made responsible to for-
eign nations for all violations by the United States of their international obli-
gations . . . .”). 
 209. Id. at 487.  
 210. See, e.g., Siegal, supra note 192, at 885–86.  
 211. United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 487 (1887).  
 212. Id. at 486–87.  
 213. Siegal, supra note 192, at 877. 
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means an “express enumeration of all the particulars included 
in that term.”214 This suggests that Congress can fill in intersti-
tial questions or resolve particular disputes and uncertainties 
about the elements of an offense, but it cannot punish primary 
conduct that is not an international crime.  
Because the Offenses Clause refers to an external legal 
standard to limit Congress, it suggests a particularly strong 
role for judicial review.215 If the law of nations cannot be used 
to establish judicially reviewable limits on Congress’s action, 
Congress could use the Offenses power to legislate regarding 
anything. The obscure Offenses Clause would overshadow all 
other regulatory powers, even the Commerce Clause.216 It 
would be odd that such a vast grant of authority over individu-
als, unchecked by any limiting principle, would exist in the 
Constitution, or that it would have gone unnoted at the conven-
tion and ratification debates.217 Thus, the most extensive ex-
amination of the question has found that courts have consis-
tently looked for substantial state practice to establish the 
existence of a CIL norm.218 
At the same time, limiting Congress to a preexisting defini-
tion would nullify the power to define, a power which the Fra-
mers deliberately conferred.219 Thus some slack between Con-
gress’s “Offences” and “the “Law of Nations” must be tolerated. 
Yet the idea that Congress is owed substantial deference in de-
 
 214. See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153,159 (1820); see also 
11 Op. Att’y Gen. 297, 299 (1865) (“To define is to give the limits or precise 
meaning of a word or thing in being; to make is to call into being. Congress 
has power to define, not to make, the laws of nations . . . .”). 
 215. See Siegal, supra note 192, at 940–42. 
 216. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  
 217. See Teachout, supra note 192, at 1321–22 (arguing that the “unambi-
tious” provision was meant to allow Congress to prosecute violations of inter-
national law for which the United States would be held accountable and, 
therefore, Congress would not need to criminalize conduct the rest of the world 
did not see as violating the “Law of Nations”).  
 218. See Siegal, supra note 192, at 895 (“[F]or the first 100 years after the 
Constitution, in deciding the existence of customary international law, justices 
of the Supreme Court looked to the actual practice of states.”). There is, how-
ever, substantial doubt about the accuracy of such judicial investigations, and 
the effort is even more difficult today due to the proliferation of relevant lan-
guages, sources, and nations that serve to establish relevant customs. See Jack 
L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1113 (1999) (arguing that the Supreme Court mistakenly 
took routine self-interested behavior for a CIL norm in the famous Paquette 
Habana case. 175 U.S. 677 (1900)). 
 219. See RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 193, at 316.  
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termining whether something violates international law ulti-
mately borders on a power to invent. This is especially true in 
an era when many loose claims are made on the basis of inter-
national law, few areas of human life lie outside the scope of 
some purported CIL norm, and some argue that CIL can 
emerge without overt state practice.220 If courts do not police 
the “Law of Nations” requirement, Congress can, by citing some 
United Nations General Assembly resolutions and law review 
articles, give itself authority over anything. This would be in-
consistent with the idea of limited and enumerated powers, and 
would tend to frustrate the purposes of judicial review. Thus 
while some slack must be allowed to exist between an objective 
judicial view of the law of nations and Congress’s definition, 
this says little about how much.  
Perhaps a useful distinguishing principle would be the 
elements of an offense as opposed to the general type of the of-
fense. For example, murder everywhere involves unjustified 
killing; premeditation may or may not be an element. Piracy 
against the “Law of Nations,” generally, is robbery on the high 
seas. Some particular elements of the offense may include ani-
mo furandi, use of force, or other factors defined by municipal 
law, but these are not essential to the form of the offense.221 
Obviously these can collapse into each other at a high enough 
level of abstraction, but line-drawing problems are the life of 
the law. 
B. DRUG SMUGGLING NOT UNIVERSALLY COGNIZABLE 
Because UJ is only available for a subset of international 
crimes, the question of whether drug smuggling has become 
modern piracy merges with the question of whether it falls un-
der the “Offences against the Law of Nations” that Congress 
can punish under the Define and Punish Clause. These two is-
sues will be discussed together here.222 The major sources of in-
ternational law are treaties and customary (unwritten) inter-
 
 220. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 
27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 115, 149–50 (2005) (describing and supporting efforts to 
weaken the requirement for active state practice and have the principal in-
quiry be existence of opinion juris, whether or not it is manifest in deeds); cf. 
Eugene Kontorovich, Ineffecient Customs in International Law, 48 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 859, 913–14 (2006) (criticizing the move towards elevating “soft 
law” to the level of state practice). 
 221. WHEATON, supra note 120, § 124. 
 222. See infra Part IV for a specific focus on other possible sources of con-
stitutional authority for the MDLEA aside from the “piracies” power. 
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national law.223 When a treaty is in the picture, the terms of 
the treaty itself govern the scope of Congress’s jurisdictional 
power.224 The Offenses Clause is implicated when there is no 
treaty basis for the law, and so one must determine whether 
Congress’s offense roughly corresponds to CIL.225  
Drug trafficking is not recognized in CIL as a universally 
cognizable offense.226 While there is no firm agreement on the 
precise set of crimes subject to UJ, there is a general consensus 
that they are egregious, violent human rights abuses.227 Not a 
single UJ offense, or indeed widely recognized international 
crime, is a so-called victimless offense.228 All U.S. courts that 
have considered the issue have held that narcotics traffic falls 
outside UJ.229 The most respected lists of UJ offenses do not 
 
 223. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 
1060 (1945). 
 224. See infra Part IV.A. UJ laws were passed specifically to implement 
certain multilateral conventions. See BOLESLAW A. BOCZEK, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 82–85 (2005). These statutes, however, arguably go further than the trea-
ties on which they are based. The conventions only purport to confer jurisdic-
tion over nationals of signatory states. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court art. 12, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 91 [hereinafter 
Rome Statute]. While most countries have joined these treaties, the imple-
menting statutes do not limit their application to nationals of signatory states. 
Cf. id. (showing that the United States is not a party to the treaty but still 
could be subject to the treaty’s jurisdictional reach).  
 225. The “Law of Nations” is generally understood as being the eighteenth-
and nineteenth-century term for CIL. See Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 
F.3d 233, 237 n.2 (“[W]e have consistently used the term ‘customary interna-
tional law’ as a synonym for the term the ‘law of nations.’”). 
 226. See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 436 (2d ed. 2005) (observ-
ing that illicit traffic in narcotic drugs is not a crime in CIL); SEAN D. MUR-
PHY, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 412–13 (2006) (describing drug traf-
fic as an area of law where there is substantial international cooperation). 
Many scholars suggest that the international crimes for which an individual 
may be held criminally responsible are congruent with those which fall under 
universal jurisdiction; certainly the major IL crimes are also universally cog-
nizable, as the factors that contribute to the former status are the same that 
lead to the latter. See CASSESE, supra, at 436. 
 227. Kontorovich, supra note 10, at 204–07. 
 228. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 (1987) 
(providing a list of UJ offenses); UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS 
AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 178–
79 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2004) (explaining that in order for a crime to qualify 
as a UJ offense it must be “contrary to a peremptory norm of international 
law” and “be so serious and on such a scale that they can justly be regarded as 
an attack on the international legal order”). 
 229. See United States v. Perlaza, 439 F.3d 1149, 1162–63 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(rejecting UJ as a jurisdictional basis for the MDLEA); United States v. 
Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d 161, 168 n.5 (3d Cir. 1986), superseded by statute, 46 
U.S.C. app. § 1903(d) (2000) (current version at 46 U.S.C.A. § 70505 (2007) 
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mention drugs at all.230 There appears to be no state practice 
establishing UJ over drug trafficking (aside from the MLDEA, 
of course).231  
The most comprehensive statement on the law of the sea 
was generated by the Third United Nations Conference on the 
Law of Sea.232 The United States has not ratified the treaty, 
but regards it as expressing the customary international law on 
the subject.233 UNCLOS expressly addresses drug smuggling 
and piracy in neighboring provisions.234 For piracy (and the 
 
(“[I]nternational agreements have yet to recognize drug smuggling as a threat 
to a nation’s ‘security as a state or the operation of its governmental functions,’ 
warranting protective jurisdiction or as a heinous crime subject to universal 
jurisdiction.” (citation omitted)); United States v. James-Robinson, 515 F. 
Supp. 1340, 1344 n.6 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (“Drug trafficking is not recognized as 
being subject to universal jurisdiction.”). But see United States v. Marino-
Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1382 n.16 (11th Cir. 1982) (finding a “growing consen-
sus” that drug trafficking should be a UJ offense and suggesting that “[i]t may 
well be that the time has arrived” that Congress “should” pass UJ legislation 
to punish “all foreign vessels on the high seas that are engaged in drug traf-
ficking”). The court’s dictum in Marino-Garcia is particularly odd in that it 
suggests Congress can substantially punish anticipated IL developments and 
act before an international consensus has emerged. Even the Eleventh Circuit 
has avoided repeating this view.  
 230. See Rome Statute, supra note 224, art. 5(1) (listing genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression as crimes within ju-
risdiction of the court); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 
§ 404 (1987); THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 29 
(Stephen Macedo ed., 2001). 
 231. See, e.g., Erik Franckx, Pacta Tertiis and the Agreement for the Im-
plementation of the Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Provisions of 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 8 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 49, 68 (2000) (“In 1992, Italy’s highest court rejected the idea that a custo-
mary rule of international law had emerged which allowed high seas interven-
tion with respect to foreign vessels suspected of drug trafficking.”); see also 
Adelheid Puttler, Extraterritorial Application of Criminal Law: Jurisdiction to 
Prosecute Drug Traffic Conducted by Aliens Abroad, in EXTRATERRITORIAL 
JURISDICTION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, 103, 115 (Karl E. Meessen ed., 1996) 
(“Universal jurisdiction to prosecute offenses concerning ‘soft’ drugs does not 
exist in customary international law.”). 
 232. See ARND BERNAERTS, 1982 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE 
LAW OF THE SEA 7–9 (1988) (providing an overview of the Third United Na-
tions Conference on the Law of the Sea).  
 233. Statement on United States Ocean Policy, 1 PUB. PAPERS 378 (Mar. 
10, 1983) (“[T]he convention . . . contains provisions with respect to traditional 
uses of the oceans which generally confirm existing maritime law and practice 
. . . .”). 
 234. Compare UNCLOS, supra note 71, arts. 100–101, 105 (dealing with 
piracy), with UNCLOS, supra note 71, art. 108 (dealing with illicit drug traf-
ficking).  
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slave trade), it explicitly provides universal jurisdiction.235 Not 
so for drug trafficking, which it makes clear is not an interna-
tional law crime.236  
The common denominator of UJ offenses is their extraor-
dinary heinousness. An offense must be regarded as so inhu-
mane, so shocking to the conscience, that it makes all jurisdic-
tional limitations moot.237 Indeed, the Second Circuit has 
recently held that terrorism has not attained the status of a 
universal jurisdiction offense, and thus U.S. courts cannot put 
it on the same jurisdictional footing as piracy.238  
The Senate Report on the MDLEA described drug smug-
gling as “universally recognized criminal behavior.”239 Yet there 
is a vast difference between conduct that all nations criminalize 
and international crimes.240 Uniform condemnation and crimi-
nalization does not make something an international crime.241 
Murder and rape, and indeed, most malum in se offenses, are 
also universally condemned, and all fall outside of international 
law.242 Presumably Congress cannot legislate the punishment 
of purely foreign rapes despite it being “universally recognized 
criminal behavior.”243 Indeed, the Senate Report makes no find-
ings that would be relevant to the offense’s being universally 
cognizable, such as the offense being extremely heinous.244 In-
deed, different nations’ drug laws and attitudes vary far more 
than those for murder.245 There simply is no state practice, and 
 
 235. See id. arts. 100–101, 105. 
 236. See id. art. 108. 
 237. See United States v. James-Robinson, 515 F. Supp. 1340, 1344 n.6 
(S.D. Fla. 1981); see also Kontorovich, supra note 10, at 204–05, 205 nn.125–
27. 
 238. See United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 107–08 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 239. See S. REP. NO. 99-530, at 16 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5986, 6001. 
 240. United States v. Medjuck, 937 F. Supp. 1368, 1394–95 (N.D. Cal. 
1996) (recognizing that drug trafficking may be universally condemned and 
criminalized but not a UJ offense like piracy). 
 241. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International 
Crimes: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 
81, 152 (2001) (distinguishing “universality of condemnation” from “universal 
reach of national jurisdiction”). 
 242. See Kontorovich, supra note 10, at 206–07. 
 243. Id. 
 244. See S. REP. NO. 99-530, at 16. 
 245. See Medjuck, 937 F. Supp. at 1394–95 (recognizing that there is no 
jurisdiction in which drug trafficking is legal). But cf. Associated Press, U.S. 
Reacts to Mexico’s Drug Legalization, FOXNEWS.COM, Apr. 30, 2006, http:// 
www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,193702,00.html (demonstrating that national 
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a palpable lack of support in relevant legal sources, for treating 
drug trafficking as a universally cognizable crime. 
C. OTHER INTERNATIONAL LAW BASES FOR JURISDICTION 
The understanding of the Define and Punish Clause devel-
oped above suggests a narrow and a broad approach to pira-
cies—the former locked into the 1789 definition of piracy, and 
the latter understanding the term to mean whatever offenses 
happen to be treated as universally cognizable. The narrow 
view would mean all UJ applications of the MDLEA are un-
constitutional. The broader view of the clause obviously de-
mands a more detailed inquiry into present-day international 
law. As shown above, drug trafficking is not universally cogniz-
able. However, the inquiry under the broad view might not end 
there.  
Today’s jurisdictional norms are more relaxed than those of 
the early Republic. Not only are there more UJ offenses, but 
other flexible jurisdictional categories have emerged that allow 
broad extraterritorial, if not universal, jurisdiction.246 Thus in 
the most open-ended (and hardest to justify) version of the dy-
namic view, if drug trafficking has become something the Unit-
ed States could exercise jurisdiction over without a nexus under 
international law, whether because of UJ or other international 
jurisdictional rules unknown to the Framers, it can be treated 
as a piracy for constitutional purposes. To explore the implica-
tions of this approach for the MDLEA, this subpart considers 
two possible non-UJ international law justifications for 
MDLEA: statelessness and the protective principle of jurisdic-
tion.  
1. Statelessness 
Recall that the Marshall Court, in a series of piracy cases, 
rejected UJ over foreign vessels in cases of murder and even 
classic piracy.247 However, in other cases decided at the same 
time, the Court held that Congress can punish murder, a non-
UJ felony, when committed on stateless vessels, even absent a 
 
attitudes toward drug manufacturing and consumption vary widely). 
 246. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403 cmt. a, 
Reporters’ Notes 1, 3 (1987) (expanding universal jurisdiction to situations 
where it is reasonable); id. § 402(3) (giving protective jurisdiction and passive 
personality jurisdiction to states over persons outside its jurisdiction). 
 247. See United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 641–42 (1818).  
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U.S. nexus.248 The vessels in these cases were stateless by vir-
tue of “turning pirate.”249 Thus these cases could be understood 
as accommodating Congress’s desire to punish pirates, some-
thing potentially endangered by the Court’s holding in Pal-
mer.250 The international law of the day did treat pirate ships 
as having lost their national character or protection.251  
These decisions may stand for nothing more than a sort of 
supplemental universal jurisdiction, allowing UJ over felonies 
when they are part of the same “case or controversy” or “com-
mon nucleus of operative fact” as a piracy. But they could stand 
for a broader proposition, that felonies can be punished aboard 
stateless vessels, or even more broadly, that the Constitution 
allows UJ over felonies to be as broad as allowable under inter-
national law. So if international law allows UJ over stateless 
vessels as part of the law of the high seas, the Define and Pu-
nish Clause incorporates this power. 
Several different provisions in the MDLEA allow for UJ. 
One of them allows for jurisdiction over stateless vessels,252 and 
UJ over stateless vessels is consistent with today’s CIL.253 
However, the MDLEA’s definition of statelessness goes far 
beyond what is recognized by international custom or conven-
tion.254 The statute defines a “vessel without nationality” as one 
whose claim of registry is denied by their government, or that 
does not claim a nationality, for example, by not flying a flag.255 
The MDLEA also includes cases in which the “nation of registry 
does not affirmatively and unequivocally assert that the vessel 
is of its nationality.”256 In other words, a properly registered, 
non-piratical vessel can be treated as stateless if the flag state 
acquiesces, or simply does not reply. Under international law, a 
 
 248. See United States v. Holmes, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 412, 417–18 (1820); 
United States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144, 150 (1820). 
 249. See Holmes, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 417. 
 250. See Kontorovich, supra note 17, at 188–92. 
 251. Though piracy is still universally cognizable, it no longer results in 
statelessness. See UNCLOS, supra note 71, art. 104 (“A ship or aircraft may 
retain its nationality although it has become a pirate ship or aircraft.”). 
 252. 46 U.S.C.A. § 70502(c)(1)(A) (2007) (extending jurisdiction to “vessels 
without nationality”). 
 253. See United States v. Moreno-Morillo, 334 F.3d 819, 824–25 (9th Cir. 
2003). 
 254. 46 U.S.C.A. § 70502(c)(2)(A)–(B). 
 255. Id.; United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1116 (11th Cir. 2002) (de-
scribing the vessel on which defendants were arrested as flying no flag and 
bearing no registry or identifying markings). 
 256. 46 U.S.C.A. § 70502(c)(2). 
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vessel without nationality is one that is not registered by any 
state, or whose registration involves some subterfuge, such as 
flying multiple flags, or flags of state with which the vessel has 
no connection.257 The MDLEA’s final “statelessness” provision 
sweeps further than this to include vessels that are properly 
authorized to fly a nation’s flag.258 This goes beyond what in-
ternational law recognizes as statelessness.259 Indeed, it is not 
a statelessness rule. It is a rule of flag state consent or waiver. 
2. Protective Jurisdiction 
Several appeals courts have held that the MDLEA can be 
justified under the “protective principle” of international juris-
diction.260 The protective principle is one of limited and uncer-
tain scope. The courts have given little reason for treating 
MDLEA offenses as within protective jurisdiction apart from 
the fact that the statutes preamble sounds vaguely like the test 
for protective jurisdiction.261 But no treaty, law, or state prac-
tice supports such broad jurisdiction over drug offenses, and 
the cases make little effort to show otherwise. 
The principle allows a state to punish extraterritorially “a 
limited class of offenses . . . directed against the security of the 
state or other offenses threatening the integrity of governmen-
tal functions.”262 The legislative findings of the MDLEA con-
 
 257. See UNCLOS, supra note 71, arts. 91–92; Convention on the High 
Seas arts. 5–6, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 2315. 
 258. 46 U.S.C.A. § 70502(c)(2). 
 259. See United States v. Moreno-Morillo, 334 F.3d 819, 826 (9th Cir. 
2003). 
 260. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 311 F.3d 440, 446 (1st Cir. 2002) 
(holding that the protective principle authorized Congress to enact the 
MDLEA); United States v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548, 553 (1st Cir. 1999) 
(“[A]pplication of the MDLEA to the defendants is consistent with the protec-
tive principle of international law because Congress has determined that all 
drug trafficking aboard vessels threatens our nation's security.”); United 
States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 494 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Drug trafficking 
presents the sort of threat to our nation’s ability to function that merits appli-
cation of the protective principle of jurisdiction.”), overruled by United States 
v. Perlaza, 439 F.3d 1149, 1162 (9th Cir. 2006) (dismissing Peterson as “dicta” 
and finding the protective principle insufficient to establish jurisdiction over 
MDLEA defendants). But see United States v. Robinson, 843 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 
1988) (describing as “forceful” the argument that the protective principle only 
applies to conduct that threatens the United States specifically, and not the 
general drug trafficking of the MDLEA). 
 261. See, e.g., Cardales, 168 F.3d at 553 (relying on a theory of territorial 
jurisdiction rather than protective jurisdiction to uphold its conviction of the 
defendant under the MDLEA). 
 262. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 cmt. f 
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clude that trafficking “presents a specific threat to the security 
and societal well-being of the United States.”263 Unlike more 
traditional forms of jurisdiction, no actual harm to these inter-
ests need be shown. Even more than UJ, the bounds of this ju-
risdictional theory are unclear.264 Commentators stress that 
the category of protective jurisdiction offenses is quite small, 
and none suggest drug smuggling as one of them.265  
Indeed, the cases that see the MDLEA as an exercise of 
protective jurisdiction fundamentally misconceive the principle. 
Protective jurisdiction applies to conduct that in itself could po-
tentially endanger the security of the United States. As the 
Restatement puts it, the conduct must be “directed against the 
security of the [forum] state . . . .”266 Thus it would have to be 
shown that the particular conduct endangered the United 
States. This could obviously not be shown, because by stipula-
tion, there is no reason to believe the drugs were destined for 
U.S. markets. Most courts, however, think the protective prin-
ciple means jurisdiction over conduct of the general kind that 
could endanger the United States.267 If some drug trafficking 
endangers the United States, the courts seem to think all drug 
trafficking can be reached.268 
 
(1987). 
 263. 46 U.S.C.A. § 70501. 
 264. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 cmt. d 
(1987) (discussing the controversy surrounding the question of whether “a 
state may exercise jurisdiction based on effects in the state, when the effect or 
intended effect is substantial and the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable un-
der § 403”). 
 265. See, e.g., Edmund S. McAlister, The Hydraulic Pressure of Vengeance: 
United States v. Alvarez-Machain and the Case for a Justifiable Abduction, 43 
DEPAUL L. REV. 449, 458–59 (1994) (“Most nations, for example, view counter-
feiting currency as falling within the aegis of protective jurisdiction. Other 
crimes that logically have an adverse impact on a state’s national interest in-
clude espionage, falsification of official documents, and perjury before consular 
officials.”). 
 266. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402(3) (empha-
sis added). 
 267. See, e.g., United States v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548, 553 (1st Cir. 1999) 
(describing how Congress has concluded that all drug trafficking aboard ves-
sels threatens the United States’ security) (citing United States v. Martinez-
Hildago, 993 F.2d 1052, 1056 (3d Cir. 1993)); United States v. Mosquera, 192 
F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1339–40 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (“The Eleventh Circuit has found 
that there does not need to be proof of a nexus between a stateless vessel and 
the country seeking jurisdiction.” (citing United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 
F.2d 1373, 1383 (11th Cir. 1982))). 
 268. See United States v. Gonzalez, 776 F.2d 931, 939 (11th Cir. 1985). 
(“The protective principle does not require that there be proof of an actual or 
intended effect inside the United States. The conduct may be forbidden if it 
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Moreover, “the security of the state” refers to the safety 
and integrity of the state apparatus itself (its “government 
functions” or “state interests”), not its overall physical and 
moral well-being.269 The Restatement’s examples demonstrate 
this: “espionage, counterfeiting of the state’s seal or currency, 
falsification of official documents, as well as perjury before con-
sular officials, and conspiracy to violate the immigration or cus-
toms laws.”270 All these crimes are aimed at or particularly in-
volve the government apparatus of the forum state. Needless to 
say, the protective principle would not authorize the United 
States to punish a Ghanan for violating Spanish immigration 
laws or bribing Spanish officials. 
There is no support for the principle reaching moral or vic-
timless crimes, and indeed, only one other Western nation casts 
its jurisdiction over drug crimes so broadly.271 Treating drug 
crimes within protective jurisdiction would eliminate any dif-
ference between protective jurisdiction and universal jurisdic-
tion. Indeed, protective jurisdiction would sweep more broadly 
than even UJ by allowing states to punish relatively minor 
crimes.  
D. “HIGH SEAS” VS. FOREIGN WATERS 
The MDLEA, in some of its applications and provisions, 
may be an ultra vires exercise of the Piracies and Felonies pow-
er for an entirely different reason—it punishes drug crimes 
even beyond the “high Seas.”272 Moreover, the Court has re-
peatedly warned that jurisdiction over foreign vessels in foreign 
waters would exceed Congress’s legislative competence. 
 
has a potentially adverse effect and is generally recognized as a crime by na-
tions that have reasonably developed legal systems.”). The court cited Res-
tatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law as support for this proposition, 
though the Restatement does not explicitly say anything of the sort. See id. at 
939 n.11. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law seems even clearer in 
its insistence that the conduct actually have effects in the forum state. See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 cmt. f (“The protec-
tive principle may be seen as a special application of the effects principle . . . 
.”). 
 269. See Puttler, supra note 231, at 109–10.  
 270. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 cmt. f. 
 271. Cf. Puttler, supra note 231, at 103–04 (describing German cases 
where prosecutors sought jurisdiction to prosecute foreign national trading in 
cannabis abroad). 
 272. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
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1. The Meaning of “High Seas” 
The Define and Punish Clause does not give Congress a 
general power over extraterritorial crimes.273 Rather, felonies 
can only be punished “on the high Seas.”274 Unlike the differ-
ence between piracy and felony, this is an express textual limi-
tation on the Define and Punish power. Without such a limita-
tion, Congress would have a general police power. The parallel 
provision, “Offences against the Law of Nations,” lacks such a 
limitation, but the class of offenses is much narrower than felo-
nies.275  
The MDLEA, by its terms, applies to non-U.S. vessels nei-
ther on the high seas nor in U.S. territorial waters—namely, to 
“vessel[s] in the territorial waters of a foreign nation . . . .”276 
The unconstitutionality of section 70502(c)(1)(E) is not a major 
impediment to the MDLEA’s policy, as apparently few if any 
cases are brought under this section.277 But many applications 
of the MDLEA’s other sections could potentially be void if “high 
Seas” in the Define and Punish Clause is read to mean what 
that term means in today’s international law. Recall that be-
cause the Define and Punish Clause uses many international 
law terms of art, it raises the question of whether their defini-
tions are locked into the law of 1789, or track changes in the 
law of nations over time. Without updating, only piracy could 
 
 273. Id. (“The Congress shall have the Power . . . [t]o define and punish Pi-
racies and Felonies committed on the high Seas . . . .”). 
 274. See id.; see also United Nations Convention on the High Seas art. 1, 
Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (“The term ‘high seas’ means all parts of the 
sea that are not included in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a 
State.”). 
 275. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 10.  
 276. 46 U.S.C.A. § 70502(c)(1)(E) (2007). While such jurisdiction can only 
be exercised with the foreign nation’s consent, this does not change the fact 
that U.S. drug law is made to apply beyond the “high Seas” limit of Clause 10. 
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. Clause 10 simply does not say “the high seas, 
or foreign territory when the sovereign does not mind.” Cf. id.  
 277. Only three cases in the Westlaw database obviously implicate this sec-
tion of the MDLEA. See United States v. McPhee, 336 F.3d 1269, 1272–73 
(11th Cir. 2003) (rejecting the defendant’s claim that his vessel was seized in 
Bahamian waters without the Bahamas’ consent); see also United States v. 
Aguilar, 286 F. App’x 716, 719 n.3 (11th Cir. 2008) (rejecting the defendant’s 
argument that the U.S. needed Honduras’s consent to subject the defendant’s 
vessel to U.S. jurisdiction in Honduran waters). The court held that the U.S. 
government did not prove its assertion that consent had been given. Id. at 723; 
see also United States v. Greer, 258 F.3d 158, 174–75 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding 
that consent given even after prosecution is initiated by the United States may 
satisfy jurisdiction under § 1903(c)(1)(E)). 
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be punished under UJ, and it would take little analysis to show 
that drug trafficking is not piracy. However, allowing updating 
could also cast doubt on much of the MDLEA. 
In today’s customary international law, as articulated in 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the high 
seas can begin up to two hundred miles out from shore.278 A 
great number of MDLEA cases—like the one in the example at 
the beginning of this Article—involve conduct in this two hun-
dred mile area that is neither the territorial waters of the for-
eign state, nor the high seas. This Article takes no position on 
the merits of updating. However, whether one decides to up-
date or not, the decision should be consistent at least within the 
Define and Punish Clause: if UJ is not locked into its 1789 pa-
rameters of including only piracy, it is hard to see why the de-
finition of the high seas should not change with the times as 
well.  
It would seem there is at least a strong policy case for up-
dating. In 1789, territorial waters ended three miles from 
shore.279 In territorial waters, Congress has plenary power over 
foreign vessels though the Admiralty Clause.280 It would be odd 
to not allow Congress to expand its territorial admiralty power 
to keep up with the maximum allowed by international law. No 
such proposition has ever been suggested. Indeed, the MDLEA 
assumes total congressional control over territorial waters as 
defined by today’s international law.281  
 
 278. United Nations Convention on the High Seas, supra note 274, art. 57. 
Under the UNCLOS regime, waters are no longer territorial or “high.” See id. 
art. 86. Rather, the new regime recognizes a broad intermediate area, the “ex-
clusive economic zone,” where the coastal state has many but not all sovereign 
rights. See id. arts. 55–57. This area is explicitly no longer treated as part of 
the high seas regime. See id. 
 279. See 2 F. GALIANI, DE’ DOVERI DE’ PRINCIPI NEUTRALI VERSO I PRINCIP 
GUERREGGIANTI, E DI QUESTI I VERSO NEUTRALI 432 (1782); see also PHILIP C. 
JESSUP, THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION 5–6 
(1927). 
 280. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES 614 (Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak eds., Carolina Aca-
demic Press 1987) (1833) (describing how the Admiralty Clause extends juris-
diction to all “acts[ ] or injuries done upon the coast of the sea[ ] or, at farthest, 
acts and injuries done with the ebb and flow of the tide”). 
 281. See 46 U.S.C.A. § 70502(c)(D) & (c)(F) (2007) (providing for jurisdic-
tion over vessels in the customs waters and the contiguous zones of the United 
States). 
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2. Precedents and the Admiralty Power 
No case has ever decided the precise scope of Congress’s 
power over foreign vessels in foreign waters largely because, 
prior to the MDLEA, the question rarely arose. Indeed, the 
leading case, United States v. Flores, is eighty years old.282 
There, the Court endorsed the view that the Define and Punish 
Clause did not reach into foreign waters.283 Flores concerned a 
murder among the American crew of a U.S. vessel while in Bel-
gian waters.284 The defendant argued that the plain text of the 
Define and Punish Clause kept it from reaching conduct in for-
eign waters.285 The Court accepted this point as self-evident.286 
However, the Court thought the prosecution could be justified 
under Congress’s power over the admiralty or maritime juris-
diction.287 An examination of the Framers’ intent and drafting 
history led the Court to conclude that the Constitution sought 
to give the federal government all powers within the area of 
admiralty.288 The Define and Punish power was thus a supple-
ment rather than a limitation to broader admiralty power.289 
The admiralty power could extend in certain circumstances 
even beyond the high seas, and the Define and Punish Clause 
should not be read to preclude this for felonies or piracies.290 
The Court’s examination of admiralty law lead it to con-
clude that the law allowed regulation “of vessels of the United 
States False . . while in foreign territorial waters.”291 Admiralty 
law follows the flag.292 Indeed, it seems crucial to the Court’s 
opinion that the case involved a U.S. ship, as the purpose of 
admiralty is to allow a nation to govern conduct on its vessels, a 
matter in which it has a great interest regardless of where they 
 
 282. 289 U.S. 137, 137 (1933). 
 283. See id. at 150–56. 
 284. Id. at 144–45. 
 285. Id. at 146–47. 
 286. See id.  
 287. See id. at 147–48. The Court inferred from the grant of judicial au-
thority over maritime and admiralty cases a correlate power of Congress to 
create the substantive body of this law. See id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, 
cl. 3). 
 288. See id. at 149–50. 
 289. See id.  
 290. See id.  
 291. Id. at 149–50 (emphasis added). 
 292. Cf. id. at 159 (“It is the duty of the courts of the United States to apply 
to offenses committed by its citizens on vessels flying its flag, its own statutes, 
interpreted in the light of recognized principles of international law.”). 
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are.293 Thus, Flores suggests Congress’s admiralty power could 
not encompass foreign vessels in foreign waters.  
This conclusion is strengthened by the only other discus-
sion of the issue by the Supreme Court, United States v. Wilt-
berger.294 Oddly, though Flores attempted to engage the origi-
nal understanding of the Constitution and the 1789 content of 
admiralty jurisdiction, it makes no mention of Wiltberger, even 
though the opinion was written by Justice Marshall, who had a 
much clearer view of the original meanings and the nuances of 
admiralty law.295 Wiltberger involved a killing among an Amer-
ican crew of a vessel on a river thirty-five miles inside China.296 
In the circuit court trial, the defendant’s counsel argued that 
applying U.S. law on China’s waterways would exceed Con-
gress’s Felonies power.297 The U.S. Attorney conceded the De-
fine and Punish Clause issue.298 Instead, he located congres-
sional authority in the admiralty and maritime power, 
anticipating Flores.299 But he did not argue that admiralty ex-
tended beyond the high seas into foreign waters.300 Rather, un-
der standard, internationally accepted admiralty principles, it 
applied to a U.S.-flagged vessel wherever it went.301 It would be 
 
 293. Cf. id. at 149–50 (“[W]e come to the question principally argued, 
whether the jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime cases . . . extends to the 
punishment of crimes committed on vessels of the United States while in for-
eign waters.”); id. at 157 (noting that the case of a foreign vessel would be a 
“different question”). 
 294. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76 , 93–94 (1820). 
 295. See also United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76 (1820). See 
generally United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137 (1933). 
 296. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 77. 
 297. United States v. Wiltberger, 28 F. Cas. 727, 728 (E.D. Pa. 1819) (No. 
16,738), certified question answered by Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76. 
 298. See id.  
 299. See id. The parties and justices involved in the Wiltberger cases 
seemed to agree that the Constitution locks in some historic version of admi-
ralty jurisdiction, but given the slight differences in their understanding of 
this jurisdiction, it is unclear what is locked in. The U.S. Attorney argued be-
low that the Constitution referred to the general principles of admiralty “as 
generally understood and exercised amongst the nations of Europe; and not to 
the exercise of it at the period when the [C]onstitution was framed.” See id. at 
728. At the Supreme Court, Justice Marshall went on to suggest that admiral-
ty jurisdiction referred to the jurisdiction of the British Admiralty, but only as 
it would have been implemented in America. See Wiltberger, 18 U.S. at 106 
n.w. For example, the power would be unburdened by certain statutes limiting 
jurisdiction over inland waterways, which Marshall said were never intended 
to be applied to the Colonies. See id. at 113. 
 300. See Wiltberger, 28 F. Cas. at 728–29. 
 301. See id. (describing how the Constitution refers to the jurisdiction un-
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“incredible” for such jurisdiction to not be authorized by the 
Constitution.302 Justice Washington, riding circuit, thought the 
question difficult enough to certify to the Supreme Court, 
which decided it the following year.303  
A unanimous Court ruled against jurisdiction, but on the 
narrowest grounds.304 Through an elaborate reading of the en-
tirety of the Crimes Act of 1789, Justice Marshall concluded 
that Congress’s punishment of manslaughter “upon the high 
seas” was intended to have a more circumscribed scope than 
the maximum outer limits of the admiralty jurisdiction.305 
Thus, Marshall did not reach the constitutional question, which 
had occupied almost all the argument in the court below. The 
statutory construction is in his own admission somewhat 
strained, and seems clearly designed to avoid a real constitu-
tional difficulty.306 
Naturally this did not stop Justice Marshall from offering 
an extended dictum on the constitutional issue. In a lengthy 
footnote attached to the certificate in the case, Marshall sug-
gested that the constitutional limits of admiralty extended 
beyond what would strictly be called the high seas.307 But his 
discussion, based on British admiralty practice, strongly im-
plied that foreign vessels on foreign waters would be ex-
cluded.308 Thus, Marshall at most would be in accord with the 
view of the U.S. Attorney, who saw the constitutionality of U.S. 
jurisdiction as depending entirely on the vessel being Ameri-
can.309  
 
derstood by the nations of Europe, which does not include subjecting a vessel 
to the authority of foreign governments, regardless of its location).  
 302. Id. (“There is no civilized nation, with which we are acquainted, where 
jurisdiction over offences committed on board of its own vessels, in foreign 
ports, would not be exercised[.]”). 
 303. See id. at 731; Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 76. 
 304. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 105. 
 305. Id. at 94–105. 
 306. See id. at 105. 
 307. Id. at 106 n.w. The principal difference is that constitutional admiral-
ty jurisdiction reaches inland rivers, bays and coastal areas beyond the open 
seas. See id. at 115. The jurisdiction given by the Constitution was that of the 
“admiralty jurisdiction of England, from which ours was derived,” though this 
seems to have referred not to the actual jurisdiction of the Court of Admiralty 
in 1789, but to some previous, perhaps purer or teleological form. See id. at 
106–09. Yet the note clearly implies that this jurisdiction, like that of Britain, 
extended only to waters in U.S. territory. Id. at 113–15. 
 308. Cf. id. at 113–15. 
 309. See id. at 82–84. But see United States v. Gourlay, 25 F. Cas. 1382, 
1397 (S.D.N.Y. 1823) (No. 15,241) (showing that as late as 1823, a district 
 2009] BEYOND THE ARTICLE I HORIZON 1237 
 
The Court has long held that the Define and Punish Clause 
has no application in foreign waters.310 Thus in these areas, 
whatever their boundaries are today, the MDLEA must depend 
on the admiralty power. But there is no support in history, 
precedent or current practice for the view that foreign vessels 
within foreign waters are within the jurisdiction of another 
state’s admiralty. Indeed, two centuries of Supreme Court dicta 
indicate otherwise.311 The scope of U.S. admiralty jurisdiction 
is generally defined by that of the British Admiralty before the 
Revolution, and that did not extend to foreign vessels in foreign 
waters.312 Thus, at least some applications of the MDLEA ex-
ceed Congress’s powers regardless of what one thinks of the pi-
racies vs. felonies issue. But the fact that Congress, in exercis-
ing a power over the high seas, included foreign waters might 
itself suggest that the statute was drafted without much 
thought about Article I limitations. 
IV.  OTHER SOURCES OF ARTICLE I POWER   
The MDLEA has been understood as an exercise of the De-
fine and Punish power, which this Article argues it exceeds. 
However, a statute is constitutional if there is any Article I ba-
sis for it, even if it is not the authority that Congress or the 
courts thought was being exercised. This Part considers possi-
ble alternative sources for Congress’s authority.313 Here the Ar-
ticle considers at some length the Treaty Power and the For-
eign Commerce Clause.314 While the latter is easily dismissed, 
 
court found it “not clear” whether Congress’s legislative authority extends to a 
murder on a U.S. vessel in Spanish waters). 
 310. See United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. 610, 630–635 (1818). 
 311. See supra notes 143–169 and accompanying text. 
 312. See Molony v. Dows, 8 Abb. Pr. 316, 329–30 (N.Y.C.P. 1859) (stating 
that English courts have jurisdiction over actions between foreigners for inju-
ries to person or property that occurred within British dominions, but “no case 
will be found in the whole course of English jurisprudence in which an action 
for an injury to the person, inflicted by one foreigner upon another in a foreign 
country, was ever held to be maintainable in an English court”); The Jerusa-
lem, 13 F. Cas. 559, 561–563 (D. Mass. 1814) (No. 7293); ALFRED CONKLING, 
THE ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION, LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF THE 
UNITED STATES 33–37 (1848); cf. Eugene Kontorovich, Originalism and the 
Difficulties of History in Foreign Affairs, 53 ST. LOUIS L.J. 39, 47–51 (2008) 
(describing civil UJ of admiralty in the early republic). 
 313. The inadequacy of two other potential powers was discussed earlier in 
this Article—the power to punish “offenses against the law of nations” in Part 
III.B, and the “admiralty and maritime” power in Part III.D, as part of the 
“high seas” discussion.  
 314. See Bradley, supra note 16, at 336 (suggesting that the Foreign Com-
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there may be a colorable treaty clause argument, but it would 
have to overcome numerous serious difficulties and uncertain-
ties, especially since the relevant treaty was ratified years after 
the MDLEA. 
A. TREATY POWER 
Under the doctrine of Missouri v. Holland, Congress can 
act outside of its otherwise enumerated powers when imple-
menting a treaty.315 However, the extent to which a treaty can 
permit congressional action that would otherwise be unconsti-
tutional remains unclear.316 Under current doctrine, legislation 
 
merce Clause and Treaty Power would likely allow Congress to regulate 
“[e]ven if there are some instances in which Article I of the Constitution would 
not [otherwise] supply Congress with authority to enact a statute exercising 
universal jurisdiction”). 
 315. 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920). Missouri was perhaps a weak case for estab-
lishing this principle. It involved a migratory bird conservation treaty. Id. at 
430–31. Justice Holmes assumed for the sake of argument, as lower courts had 
held, that the hunting of such birds could not be reached through Congress’s 
enumerated powers. Id. at 431–32. But he did not demonstrate this crucial 
proposition, and it is not obvious even under the narrower commerce doctrine 
of the time. Moreover, if the Foreign Commerce Power is broader than the in-
terstate power, it could have itself provided an Article I basis for the statute. 
Commerce Clause arguments played little role in the lower court litiga-
tion. Instead, the lower courts relied on an earlier Supreme Court decision, 
holding that state animal export regulations do not violate the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, as meaning that wildlife falls wholly outside the scope of 
the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., United States v. Samples, 258 F. 479, 481 
(W.D. Mo. 1919), aff ’d sub. nom. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (cit-
ing United States v. Shauver, 214 F. 154, 157–58 (E.D. Ark. 1914)). Of course 
the scope of permissible state action under the Dormant Commerce Clause is 
not coterminous with permissible congressional regulation under the Com-
merce Clause. Congress can properly regulate many things which, in the ab-
sence of such legislation, states can affect through their policies. 
 316. The debate goes back to the founding era. Compare Curtis A. Bradley, 
The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390 (1998) (ar-
guing that the treaty power should not be construed so as to negate federal-
ism), Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Jeffersonian Treaty Clause, 2006 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1 (2006) (arguing that the Treaty Clause simply authorizes an ad-
ditional method for carrying out powers already granted, and thus could not 
support treaties that go beyond existing federal powers), and Nicholas Quinn 
Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1867 (2005) (ar-
guing that Missiouri v. Holland was wrongly decided), with David M. Golove, 
Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist 
Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075 (2000) (arguing that a 
broad understanding of the treaty power is consistent with constitutional his-
tory), and David Sloss, International Agreements and the Political Safeguards 
of Federalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1963, 1975–88 (2003) (arguing that judicially 
enforced limitations on the treaty power are unnecessary because the required 
two-thirds majority Senate confirmation protects federalism). 
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pursuant to treaties can trump structural constitutional con-
straints such as federalism, but not express limitations on con-
gressional power, such as the individual rights guarantees in 
the Bill of Rights.317 The MDLEA does not raise any questions 
of federalism or separation of powers, or violate express indi-
vidual rights.318 Thus under Missouri it would be a valid exer-
cise of Congress’s authority if “necessary and proper” to some 
treaty.319 
The question, however, is whether there is such a treaty. 
The legislative history of the act does not mention any treaty. 
Similarly, courts do not refer to a treaty as a source for Con-
gress’s Article I authority, though they have mentioned treaties 
to show that the MDLEA complies with international law320 
and fairness.321 The courts and Congress were right to not in-
voke the Treaty Power. As discussed above, the Law of the Sea 
Convention does not authorize UJ over drug trafficking, and 
seems to prohibit it by expressio unius.322 There is another trea-
ty implicated by the MDLEA—the United Nations Convention 
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Sub-
stances, which builds on UNCLOS provisions urging coopera-
tion against drug-trafficking.323 However, a close examination 
 
 317. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 324–29 (1988); Reid v. Covert, 354 
U.S. 1, 16–19 (1957); Bradley, supra note 316, at 424–26; Edward T. Swaine, 
Negotiating Federalism: State Bargaining and the Dormant Treaty Power, 49 
DUKE L.J. 1127, 1194 (2000). 
 318. Some have challenged the statute’s UJ provisions on due process 
grounds. See supra Part I.C.1. Those challenges, which courts have almost en-
tirely rejected, fall outside the scope of this argument. For purposes of argu-
ment, the Article here assumes the MDLEA does not violate the Fifth 
Amendment, and thus could fairly be an exercise of treaty power. 
 319. See Bradley, supra note 16, at 336–41. 
 320. United States v. Bravo, 489 F.3d 1, 7–8 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 321. United States v. Suerte, 291 F.3d 366, 377 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 322. See Michael A. Becker, The Shifting Public Order of the Oceans: Free-
dom of Navigation and the Interdiction of Ships at Sea, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
131, 179, 203–04 (2005) (noting that, unlike UNCLOS, the U.N. Narcotics 
Convention does not explicitly provide for universal jurisdiction); Sandra L. 
Hodgkinson et al., Challenges to Maritime Interception Operations in the War 
on Terror: Bridging the Gap, 22 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 583, 650 (2007) (“Al-
though UNCLOS provides for universal jurisdiction on the high seas for cer-
tain crimes, counter-narcotics operations are not among the general exceptions 
that confer jurisdiction.”). 
 323. United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances, adopted Dec. 19, 1988, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 101-
4 (1989), 1582 U.N.T.S. 165 [hereinafter U.N. Narcotics Convention]. The 
Convention has more than 170 state parties. Juliana Gonzalez-Pinto, Interdic-
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of the Convention shows it cannot easily be taken as a basis for 
the MDLEA. 
The provisions of the Convention that specifically contem-
plate MDLEA-type situations do not create universal jurisdic-
tion.324 The Convention’s jurisdictional provision first requires 
parties to take jurisdiction of offenses committed within their 
respective territorial or flag jurisdiction.325 It goes on to en-
courage but not require states to enter into agreements with 
each other authorizing interdiction of drug trafficking by each 
other’s vessels326—exactly the kind of arrangements under 
which most MDLEA cases arise.327 
1. Bilateral Maritime Agreements 
Under these bilateral agreements, if both the interdicting 
and the flag-state agree, the former may exercise adjudicative 
jurisdiction over the latter’s nationals arrested in the course of 
the interdiction efforts.328 The Convention does not require any 
state to exercise such extraterritorial jurisdiction.329 Nor does it 
authorize it—ultimately, it is the home state’s consent that 
makes prosecution possible, and the home state’s consent 
would have had exactly the same legal effect in the absence of 
the UN Convention.330 The Convention merely speaks of the 
possibility of such arrangements.331 Thus this provision of the 
Convention creates no new rights or obligations, so it is hard to 
see how it could be a source of additional legislative power for 
Congress. 
Nor do the Maritime Agreements themselves—the bilateral 
arrangements contemplated by the Convention, and in whose 
 
tion of Narcotics in International Waters, 15 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
443, 448 (2008). 
 324. See Natalie Klein, The Right of Visit and the 2005 Protocol on the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 35 
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 287, 303–04 (2007).  
 325. U.N. Narcotics Convention, supra note 323, art. 4(1)(a). 
 326. See id. art. 17(4)(c).  
 327. See, e.g., United States v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548, 522 (1st Cir. 1999); 
United States v. Khan, 35 F.3d 426, 428 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 328. See U.N. Narcotics Convention, supra note 323, art. 4(1)(b)(ii). 
 329. See id. art. 4(1)(b). 
 330. See id. art. 4(1) (indicating that states automatically have jurisdiction 
over their vessels and territorial waters); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW § 522 cmt. e (1987). 
 331. See U.N. Narcotics Convention, supra note 323, art. 4(1); MURPHY, 
supra note 226, at 412–13 (describing the Convention as setting up the 
framework for international cooperation but not as criminalizing any conduct). 
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shadow the MDLEA prosecutions occur—provide a Treaty 
Power basis for the statute. First, most of them are not treaties 
but rather mere executive agreements, entered into by State 
Department officials with no congressional input, let alone ad-
vice and consent.332 Even defenders of the broad “nationalist” 
view of Missouri do not think executive agreements can be 
substitute for treaties.333 Moreover, the Agreements do not con-
fer any authority on the United States with respect to prosecu-
tion. Rather, they simply set up rules for cooperation in drug 
interdiction; they do not authorize, let alone require, the United 
States to prosecute.334 
The standard jurisdictional clause provides that the flag 
state, while retaining “primary” jurisdiction, “may . . . waive its 
primary right to exercise jurisdiction and authorize the en-
forcement of United States law against the vessel and/or per-
sons on board.”335 Some agreements go further and expressly 
disclaim giving any jurisdiction to the United States.336 Simply 
put, these agreements do not give the United States any juris-
diction it did not previously have. Indeed, the purpose of the 
agreements is to facilitate enforcement, not prosecution.337 
This waiver is done on a case by case basis, usually in-
itiated by a State Department or Coast Guard request.338 Often 
the consent is provided by low-level functionaries.339 It may be 
provided orally, and in some cases, the source, form, and con-
 
 332. See Becker, supra note 322, at 179; Joseph E. Kramek, Comment, Bi-
lateral Maritime Counter-Drug and Immigrant Interdiction Agreements: Is 
This the World of the Future?, 31 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 121, 135–37 
(2000). But see Agreement to Suppress Illicit Traffic by Sea, U.S.-Colom., Feb. 
20, 1997, T.I.A.S. No. 12,835. 
 333. See Golove, supra note 316, at 1306–09. 
 334. See Kramek, supra note 332, at 123–24. The State Department uses a 
six-part “Model Maritime Agreement,” which covers enforcement issues like 
shipriders, pursuit, overflights, and boarding. See id. at 133–35, app. at 152–
60. Most of the nations with which the United States has such deals have 
agreed to less than all six parts. Id. app. at 150. 
 335. Id. app. at 157–58. 
 336. See, e.g., U.S.-Jam. Agreement, supra note 81, art. 3(5); U.S.-Barb. 
Agreement, supra note 81, art. 15(2). 
 337. See Kramek, supra note 332, app. at 152–53. 
 338. See, e.g., United States v. Leuro-Rosas, 952 F.2d 616, 619–20 (1st Cir. 
1991) (discussing variety of informal circumstances in which such requests can 
arise); Gary W. Palmer, Guarding the Coast: Alien Migrant Interdiction Oper-
ations at Sea, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1565, 1568–69 (1997); Kramek, supra note 
332, at 133 n.72. 
 339. Kramek, supra note 332, at 133 n.72. 
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tent of the consent remains obscure.340 Such authorization cer-
tainly falls short of a formal treaty, or even of an executive 
agreement. Certainly such consent, especially when made in 
the framework of a bilateral agreement and in the shadow of 
the UN Convention, removes any potential international law 
problems with U.S. jurisdiction. But that does not answer the 
Article I question. The notion that a mere waiver by another 
nation of its rights at international law can expand the legisla-
tive competence of Congress goes much further than even the 
broadest view of Missouri v. Holland.341 
Indeed, the bilateral agreements highlight a danger of Hol-
land’s rule that Congress can expand its legislative powers 
through treaty. Generally the consent of the foreign state is 
understood as some kind of check on abuses of the Treaty Pow-
er. Foreign states will presumably not enter deals just to allow 
Congress to aggrandize itself. But the United States has ex-
traordinary bargaining power with respect to most of the na-
tions it has signed bilateral maritime agreements with, such as 
St. Kitts and Nevis, or Dominica.342  
Many nations were reluctant to enter agreements which 
they saw as impinging on their sovereign territory or law en-
forcement functions.343 Washington, however, threatened these 
states with substantial aid reductions and other economic sanc-
tions if they did not enter the agreements.344 Such ultimatums 
caused quite a bit of bad feeling in countries like Jamaica, but 
have proven ultimately effective.345 Yet it would have potential-
 
 340. See, e.g., United States v. Normandin, 378 F. Supp. 2d 4, 8 (D.P.R. 
2005); Christina E. Sorensen, Comment, Drug Trafficking on the High Seas: A 
Move Toward Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 4 EMORY INT’L 
L. REV. 207, 223–24 (1990) (describing informal and oral consent deemed ade-
quate in MDLEA cases).  
 341. 252 U.S. 416 (1920). Even if the maritime agreements were to provide 
a Treaty Clause hook for the MDLEA, they would still leave open the question 
of those people convicted in the past two decades who were seized on vessels of 
states with whom the United States did not have an agreement.  
 342. Cf. Lloyd Williams, The Shiprider Agreement: No Smooth Sailing, JA-
MAICA GLEANER, Feb. 8, 2004, available at http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/ 
gleaner/20040208/cleisure/cleisure2.html. 
 343. See Statement of Admiral Riutta, supra note 76; Williams, supra note 
342. 
 344. See Williams, supra note 342 (“The dominant view throughout Latin 
America, the Caribbean and, of course, Jamaica, . . . was that Uncle Sam was 
being his big, bad bullying self, threatening that these nations sign a standard 
agreement, or be de-certified [from a list of nations that fight drugs, and thus 
lose U.S. funding].”). 
 345. Kramek, supra note 332, at 146 (“[S]ome countries feel compelled into 
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ly troubling implications if such purchased treaties could give 
Congress power to do what Article I does not allow.346 
2. Extradite or Punish Provisions 
The strongest Treaty Clause basis for the MDLEA is a pro-
vision of the U.N. Narcotics Convention contained in the adja-
cent section of the jurisdictional article, that permits but does 
not require states to punish or extradite offenders “present in 
its territory” but otherwise unconnected to the forum.347 Once 
MDLEA defendants are seized on the high seas by the Coast 
Guard for the purposes of prosecution, they are “present” in 
U.S. territory. Nonetheless, a combination of factors makes it 
doubtful whether the Convention authorizes UJ in cases where 
offenders are seized on the high seas.  
The Narcotics Convention contains particular jurisdictional 
and substantive clauses dealing with joint drug interdiction on 
the high seas—the provisions that prompted the creation of the 
bilateral maritime treaties.348 These provisions provide for the 
arrest of foreign drug traffickers under certain circumstances. 
Thus one might be hesitant to construe an entirely separate ju-
risdictional provision, 4(2)(b),349 as covering cases where the de-
fendant is “present” in the forum state because of the operation 
of arrangements specifically addressed by those cooperation 
clauses.350 One can read 4(1)(b)(2) as being exclusive of (2)(b).351 
In other words, the provisions that discuss jurisdiction over 
vessels solely govern maritime drug smuggling; thus the broad-
er provision would not be available. Indeed, in the drafting of 
the Convention, extending UJ to drug trafficking vessels was 
mentioned and rejected.352 
 
signing bilateral maritime agreements with the United States.”). 
 346. Cf. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08 (1987) (discussing lim-
its on Congress’s Article I spending power). 
 347. U.N. Narcotics Convention, supra note 323, art. 4(2)(b). 
 348. See id. art. 17. 
 349. Id. art. 4(2)(b). 
 350. See id. art. 17(4) (referring to “treaties in force between [Parties]” and 
“agreement[s] or arrangement[s] otherwise reached between those Parties” in 
explaining when States are authorized to take certain actions with respect to 
vessels). 
 351. See id. art. 4(1)(b)(ii) (conditioning jurisdiction over offences commit-
ted on board vessels on authorization under article 17); id. art. (4)(2)(b) (refer-
ring to other bases for establishing jurisdiction over offenses). 
 352. See Klein, supra note 324, at 304 (discussing rejection of a Canadian 
proposal to put drug trafficking on the same footing as piracy by allowing 
boarding of vessels without flag states’ consent). 
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This conclusion is strengthened when one reads the U.N. 
Narcotics Convention alongside UNCLOS, to which the Narcot-
ics Convention explicitly refers.353 As discussed above, UN-
CLOS only authorizes UJ over piracy and slave trading; for 
maritime drug trafficking it merely calls for “cooperat[ion].”354 
Because UNCLOS provides a comprehensive set of regulations 
for maritime matters, the Narcotics Convention should not be 
easily read as expanding UJ over conduct committed on the 
high seas beyond what UNCLOS allows. Indeed, those provi-
sions of the Narcotics Convention that deal with maritime ves-
sels simply elaborate the content of cooperation.355 Thus the 
broader “extradite or punish” provisions should not be read as 
conferring a separate authority over persons apprehended on 
the high seas.356  
UNCLOS establishes a general rule of freedom of the seas 
and does not make an exception for drug trafficking, but rather 
reflects a deliberate judgment to not allow UJ in such cases.357 
Interpreting the Illicit Substances Convention as authorizing 
UJ would mean putting the two treaties in conflict as to the 
permissible scope of jurisdiction. This would be awkward for 
the over 150 nations that are parties to both treaties.358 It 
would also have ungainly consequences for the MDLEA. While 
the United States is not currently a party to UNCLOS, despite 
having signed it,359 Congress could presumably act under the 
arguably broader jurisdictional provisions of the Illicit Traffic 
Convention. Yet if the Senate ratifies UNCLOS, as most ob-
 
 353. See U.N. Narcotics Convention, supra note 323, art. 17(1) (referring to 
the “international law of the sea”). 
 354. See UNCLOS, supra note 71, art. 108(1). 
 355. See U.N. Narcotics Convention, supra note 323, art. 17. 
 356. Other commentators seem to agree that the Convention does not 
create UJ where UNCLOS did not. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 322, at 179, 
203; Hodgkinson et al., supra note 322, at 650; Klein, supra note 324, at 303–
04.  
 357. See UNCLOS, supra note 71, art. 108. 
 358. See UNITED NATIONS DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF 
THE SEA, TABLE RECAPITULATING THE STATUS OF THE CONVENTION, AND OF 
THE RELATED AGREEMENTS, AS OF 19 DECEMBER 2008 (2008), http://www.un 
.org/Depts/los/reference_files/status2008.pdf [hereinafter UNCLOS TABLE] 
(listing parties to the UNCLOS); Europa Treaties Office Database, Summary 
of Treaty: United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances, http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/ 
prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralData.do?step=0&redirect= 
true&treatyId=526 (last visited Mar. 3, 2009) (listing parties to the U.N. Nar-
cotics Convention). 
 359. See UNCLOS TABLE, supra note 358, at 8. 
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servers expect it to do in the near future, the last-in-time rule 
with respect to treaties would mean that UNCLOS cuts off 
Congress’s Treaty Power to authorize the MDLEA.360 Given the 
number of nations party to both treaties, it seems safest to con-
strue their provisions so as to not conflict. 
Finally, it is not clear that the Convention contemplated 
coerced presence in its authorization of jurisdiction over 
“present” defendants. U.S. courts have concluded that such fac-
tors clearly make no difference under U.S. law. And similar 
“extradite or punish” provisions in other treaties have been 
held to allow jurisdiction based on coerced presence.361 Still, for 
purposes of the Treaty Power, it matters what the treaty itself 
permits.362 Since the only basis for Congress’s power is the 
terms of the treaty, it would be bootstrapping to read U.S. doc-
trines like the Ker-Frisbie rule back into the treaty.363 While 
the Convention does not directly address the question, the pas-
sive tone of “present” suggests there was no particular inten-
tion of ruling out forced presence.364 
3. Novel Problems with the Convention as a Constitutional 
Basis 
Some additional—and exotic——issues cast doubt on the 
U.N. Narcotics Convention as a Treaty treaty Power basis for 
the MDLEA.365 First, the Convention was drafted and ratified 
 
 360. See, e.g., Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (“[I]f there be 
any conflict between the stipulations of the treaty and the requirements of the 
law, the latter must control.”). 
 361. See United States v. Shi, 525 F.3d 709, 721 (9th Cir. 2008) (upholding 
jurisdiction over an alien who committed an offense on the high seas on a for-
eign vessel under a statute implementing mandatory “extradite or punish” 
provisions of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the 
Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 672 [hereinafter Ma-
ritime Safety Convention]); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 95–96 (2d 
Cir. 2003) (discussing a similar provision in the Convention to Discourage Acts 
of Violence Against Civil Aviation art. 7, Sept. 23, 1971, 10 I.L.M. 1151 [herei-
nafter Montreal Convention], which permits but does not require exercise of 
jurisdiction). 
 362. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 662–63 (1992) 
(suggesting that the Ker-Frisbie doctrine could be trumped by a countervailing 
treaty prohibition on forcibly bringing people into the United States, but find-
ing that the extradition treaty with Mexico contained no such limitation). 
 363. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952) (holding that U.S. courts 
have jurisdiction over defendants even if their presence was not secured in ac-
cord with extradition treaties); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886) (same). 
 364. See U.N. Narcotics Convention, supra note 323, art. 4(2)(a). 
 365. It appears to be an open question whether legislation “necessary and 
proper” to a treaty is limited to treaty obligations or whether it can implement 
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several years after the MDLEA was enacted.366 (This explains 
why Congress did not see the law as an exercise of the Treaty 
Power.) At the very least, the Convention does nothing for con-
stitutionality of the statute’s UJ provisions ab initio. Whether 
an unconstitutional statutory provision can be saved by a sub-
sequent treaty is a nice question.367 Congress’s authority for 
legislation pursuant to treaties is a combination of the Article 
II Treaty Power and the Necessary and Proper Clause. Even 
though the latter has been given almost limitless scope,368 it 
would seem fundamentally odd to say that a statute was “ne-
cessary” to implement a treaty not yet in existence. 
Even when the treaty was subsequently ratified, Congress 
had not enacted the law to implement the treaty. If the law is 
“necessary” to the treaty, that should be determined by a new 
Congress. It would be an invitation to mischief if a statute that 
is constitutionally dead on arrival could be resuscitated by a 
subsequent treaty or judicial reinterpretation, without any ad-
ditional action by Congress.369 One could never know with fi-
 
permissive or hortatory provisions. The U.N. Narcotics Convention’s “extradite 
or punish” provisions are not mandatory (“may” rather than “shall”). See id. 
art. 6. This has not been an obstacle to courts finding jurisdiction under per-
missive extradite or punish in other treaties. See United States v. Yousef, 327 
F.3d 56, 95–96 (2d Cir. 2003) (discussing the extradite or punish clause of the 
Montreal Convention, supra note 361); United States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121, 
1128–32 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (discussing the extradite or punish clause of the 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 
22 U.S.T. 1621, 1973 U.N.T.S. 106, and upholding jurisdiction over the defen-
dant). The Ninth Circuit, in upholding jurisdiction under the Maritime Safety 
Convention, noted that the enabling legislation as a whole “was necessary” to 
“satisfy th[e] obligation” of the treaty, which requires signatories to punish or 
extradite offenders. Shi, 525 F.3d at 721 (discussing the Maritime Safety Con-
vention, supra note 361, art. 7, and related legislation). It would certainly be 
extraordinary for a court to find a law unconstitutional for failing to be “neces-
sary and proper” to some legitimate power. 
 366. The United States ratified the Convention in 1990, four years after 
the MDLEA was enacted. See U.N. Narcotics Convention, supra note 323. 
Some of that statute’s UJ aspects had been on the books from the Marijuana 
on the High Seas Act of 1980. See Pub. L. No. 96-350, 94 Stat. 1159 (1980) (co-
dified as amended at 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 70501–70507 (2007)). 
 367. There is little discussion of this question in cases or literature. It is 
not answered by Missouri v. Holland, where Congress passed a second statute 
“pursuant” to the treaty after an earlier one had run afoul in the lower courts: 
in that case, the treaty still preceded the statute. See 252 U.S. 416, 431–32 
(1919).  
 368. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 419–20 
(1819) (interpreting the Necessary and Proper Clause broadly and laying the 
groundwork for its further expansion). 
 369. Perhaps the closest analog to the present question is the effect of con-
stitutional amendments on previously void treaties. Many who supported the 
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nality which statutes were “dead” and which merely in a state 
of suspended animation.  
The question turns on broader question about the meaning 
and content of congressional intent. The MDLEA has been 
amended in various ways in recent years,370 and an entirely 
new section of the statute enacted in 2008 creates a completely 
novel UJ offense—operating a submersible vessel.371 The 
changes have not narrowed the statute’s jurisdictional scope; if 
anything, they have expanded some of its provisions.372 Thus 
one might take this as an expression of congressional endorse-
ment of the rest of the statute.373 In any case, if the MDLEA 
exceeds Article I powers, the subsequent ratification of the 
treaty could certainly not save convictions and sentences se-
cured up until then. 
A second problem with using the Convention to justify the 
MDLEA lies in limitations imposed by the Senate when it rati-
fied the treaty. The United States entered a declaration that 
“nothing in [the U.N. Narcotics Convention] requires or autho-
rizes legislation or other action by the United States of America 
prohibited by the Constitution of the United States.”374 If the 
 
Civil Rights Act of 1866’s policy thought the Act was unconstitutional. This 
motivated the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. While key supporters of 
the Amendment thought it would effect a “retroactive constitutionalization” of 
the 1866 Act, Congress significantly chose to explicitly reenact the law after 
the Amendment was passed. See David S. Bogen, Slaughter-House 5: Five 
Views of the Case, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 333, 360 n.158 (2003). 
 370. See 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 70502, 70505, Historical and Statutory Notes 
(2007). 
 371. See Drug Trafficking Interdiction Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-407, 
122 Stat. 4296 (to be codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 46 U.S.C.). 
 372. The Drug Trafficking Vessel Interdiction Act of 2008, provides a crim-
inal and civil penalty for people operating certain stateless submersible ves-
sels “with the intent to evade detection,” on the high seas and even in the ter-
ritorial waters of another country. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2285(a) (West 2008) 
(criminal); 46 U.S.C.A. § 70508(a), (d) (West 2008) (civil). This targets yet 
another drug-smuggling tactic, but certainly not one that has even been sug-
gested to be universally cognizable. Indeed, the legislative findings note that 
the practice is a “serious international problem,” but not “universally con-
demned” as drug trafficking is. 46 U.S.C.A. § 70501 (2007). The statute also 
notes that it “facilitates transnational crime, including drug trafficking, and 
terrorism, and presents a specific threat to the safety of maritime navigation 
and the security of the United States,” providing a potential basis for protec-
tive rather than universal jurisdiction. See Drug Trafficking Vessel Interdic-
tion Act § 101. 
 373. Cf. WILLIAM S. ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, 
243–45 (discussing whether congressional acquiescence in judicial interpreta-
tion of statutes can be inferred from the amendment of a relevant statute).  
 374. See Reservations and Declarations Made Upon Ratification or Acces-
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Constitution can be said to “prohibit” universal jurisdiction 
over non-universal crimes, then the Convention cannot confer 
such a power. A question remains whether “prohibited” is 
meant simply to track the Missouri v. Holland sense of “ex-
pressly ruled out,” or in the more common sense of not autho-
rized by constitutional law. One might favor the latter reading 
because the Senate has since the 1950s attached such declara-
tions to treaties specifically because of their discomfort with the 
broad rule of Missouri.375 With the U.N. Narcotics Convention, 
the primary concern behind the declaration seems to have been 
the extradition of U.S. citizens to countries that would not af-
ford them due process.376 This does not mean the senators 
would not have thought the declaration applicable to otherwise 
unconstitutional expansions of Congress’s criminal powers. 
Most likely, the potential UJ issues raised by the Convention 
escaped their notice.377  
B. FOREIGN COMMERCE CLAUSE 
One might think the Foreign Commerce Clause378 could 
support the MDLEA.379 After all, the Interstate Commerce 
Clause,380 assisted by the Necessary and Proper power, allows 
Congress to regulate much that is not itself interstate com-
merce.381 And perhaps the scope of the Foreign Commerce 
 
sion of the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances, Feb. 20, 1990, 1582 U.N.T.S. 404. 
 375. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 412, at 8 (1953) (discussing the constitutional 
amendment proposed by S.J. Res. 1, 83rd Cong. (1953)); 136 CONG. REC. 
36192–99 (1990) (debating the reservations, declarations, and understandings 
to be attached to the Senate’s advice and consent to the Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment).  
 376. See 135 CONG. REC. 31384–88 (1989) (statement of Sen. Helms).  
 377. The Attorney General’s description of the jurisdictional provisions to 
the Senate did not mention UJ at all, and indeed, his discussion of its extra-
territorial affect implied it would not allow UJ. See id. at 31387 (statement of 
Dick Thornburgh) (“Parties may establish jurisdiction over offenses committed 
by their nationals, committed on board vessels outside their territorial waters 
which are properly boarded and searched, and with respect to conspiratorial 
offenses committed outside their territory with a view to commission of a cov-
ered offense within their territory.”). 
 378. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3. 
 379. See Bradley, supra note 16, at 336 (“[A]t least some invocations of the 
universal jurisdiction concept by Congress are likely to involve situations in 
which there are effects on foreign commerce—for example, the disruption of 
shipping lanes or air traffic due to piracy.”). 
 380. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3. 
 381. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995) (discuss-
ing Congress’s power to regulate not only interstate commerce, but also activi-
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Clause is even broader:382 since the regulation of foreign com-
merce is an exclusively federal power, it does not run up 
against federalism principles or reserved rights of states.383 
However, the MDLEA lies even beyond the Foreign Com-
merce power. However broad it is, the power does not authorize 
legislation regarding conduct with no demonstrable and direct 
nexus with the United States.384 Exactly how much of a connec-
tion the conduct must have is a difficult question, but one that 
need not be answered in a UJ case. With the MDLEA UJ cases, 
there is no evidence of any connection to the United States.  
Not surprisingly, there is little precedent or commentary 
on this issue.385 When Congress legislates extraterritorially, as 
it does with increasing frequency, it is almost always because of 
the foreign conduct’s effect on U.S. commerce, not despite it. 
However, what authority there is clearly recognizes a limit to 
the Foreign Commerce power, one that UJ legislation would 
exceed. One of the earliest and most significant discussions of 
UJ flatly rejected using the Foreign Commerce power as a 
substitute for the Define and Punish power: 
Rather than relying on Congress’s direct authority under Article I 
Section 8 to define and punish offenses against the law of nations, the 
government contends that Congress has authority to regulate global 
air commerce under the commerce clause. . . . But [Congress] is not 
empowered to regulate foreign commerce which has no connection to 
the United States. Unlike the states, foreign nations have never sub-
mitted to the sovereignty of the United States government nor ceded 
their regulatory powers to the United States.386 
 
ties that substantially affect interstate commerce); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 
U.S. 111, 116–17, 133 (1942) (upholding Congress’s power to pass a law regu-
lating a farmer’s individual production and consumption of wheat). 
 382. See Japan Line, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979) (“[T]here 
is evidence that the Founders intended the scope of the foreign commerce 
power to be the greater. Cases of this Court . . . echo this distinction.”) (cita-
tions omitted). 
 383. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (explicating how 
allowing Congress to regulate broadly under the Interstate Commerce Clause 
can intrude into states’ rights). 
 384. See Bradley, supra note 16, at 329 (discussing situations covered in 
the MDLEA that include no express requirement of a nexus with the United 
States).  
 385. See id. at 336 (“The precise limits of [the foreign commerce] power are 
unclear.”). 
 386. United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 907 n.24 (D.D.C. 1988); see 
also United States v. Georgescu, 723 F. Supp. 912, 918 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (ob-
serving that the Foreign Commerce Clause gives Congress power “to criminal-
ize activities affecting our foreign commerce” (emphasis added)). 
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Thus courts in MLDEA cases have entirely disclaimed the 
Foreign Commerce Clause as a basis for the law.387  
The question of UJ and the Foreign Commerce Clause was 
recently discussed at some length by Prof. Colangelo. He con-
cludes: 
The text of the Foreign Commerce Clause along with what we know 
about the founders’ beliefs regarding state sovereignty and attendant 
rules of jurisdictional non-interference lead persuasively to the con-
clusion that for Congress to act extraterritorially under the Clause, 
the conduct it seeks to regulate must exhibit a direct connection to 
U.S. commerce.388 
This is not the place to recapitulate Prof. Colangelo’s able 
exposition of the arguments. Briefly, the text of the clause sug-
gests that the commerce must be “with” the United States. The 
Constitution does not use the term “among” that it uses for 
“commerce among the states.”389 This shows that it is not 
enough for the commerce to be between some foreign states. 
Rather, the United States must be on one side of the transac-
tion. Moreover, the Framers’ territorial concepts of jurisdiction 
make it highly improbable that they intended to give Congress 
plenary power to legislate over all global economic activity.390 
Nothing in the underlying purposes of the Foreign Commerce 
Clause suggests such a power. Consider the kinds of laws Con-
gress can pass under its interstate commerce powers. Surely it 
would be odd to think the Constitution empowers Congress to 
legislate safety conditions for Yemeni shoe repairmen, or regu-
late backyard wheat production or prostitution in Pakistan.391 
 
 387. See United States v. Moreno-Morillo, 334 F.3d 819, 824 (9th Cir. 
2003). 
 388. Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Juris-
diction: Terrorism and the Intersection of National and International Law, 48 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 121, 147 (2007). 
 389. See id. at 148–49 (analyzing the language in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 
3). 
 390. See id. at 149–51. Furthermore, to the extent the protections of the 
Bill of Rights, such as the Takings Clause, do not apply to foreigners abroad, 
Congress’s power to legislate for foreign countries could exceed its power to 
legislate domestically, a counterintuitive result. 
 391. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588 (1952) 
(“[Congress] can make laws . . . fixing wages and working conditions in certain 
fields of our economy.”); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 116–17, 133 (1942) 
(upholding a law regulating private production of wheat under the Interstate 
Commerce Clause); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 492 (1917) 
(upholding a law prohibiting interstate transportation of women for prostitu-
tion or other immoral purposes). 
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To continue the reductio ad absurdum, if one thought the 
Foreign Commerce power to be as robust as the domestic one, it 
would imply the existence of a Dormant Foreign Commerce 
Clause—a power of federal courts or Congress to strike down 
foreign laws that burden international commerce.392 Such a 
power has never been suggested because of the fundamentally 
different nature of domestic intrastate commerce from purely 
foreign commerce. This shows that one cannot simply export 
doctrine from the Interstate Commerce Clause to the Foreign 
one. 
Therefore, many applications of the MDLEA, especially to 
non-stateless vessels, exceed Congress’s powers under the De-
fine and Punish Clause, and other constitutional sources of 
congressional authority do not provide an alternative basis. 
Going forward, it would not be difficult for Congress to provide 
a Treaty Clause basis if it wanted to, by transforming the bila-
teral maritime agreements into treaties, which would explicitly 
authorize, or provide a framework for authorizing (rather than 
merely noting the possibility, as the current agreements do) 
prosecution of foreign nationals in the United States.  
  CONCLUSION   
Congress has almost never used its Define and Punish 
power to punish conduct other than piracy with no connection 
to the United States. The first time it did so, in 1790, the Su-
preme Court narrowly interpreted the law to avoid constitu-
tional difficulties. Soon after, Congress abandoned a much-
desired UJ provision for the slave trade because of similar 
doubts. One hundred sixty years later, Congress ventured back 
into the poorly chartered-waters of UJ with the MDLEA—and 
ran afoul of shoals.  
In general, the Constitution does not empower Congress to 
legislate over foreigners in international waters or abroad. If 
Congress could do so, its powers would be unlimited. There is 
an exception to this for piracy, stateless vessels, and perhaps 
other crimes over which international law allows UJ. But Con-
gress cannot by fiat make something a UJ offense when CIL 
does not treat it as such. To paraphrase Furlong, if by calling 
 
 392. Along with empowering Congress to regulate interstate commerce, the 
Commerce Clause limits states’ power to discriminate against interstate com-
merce. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992) (explaining 
the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine and applying it to invalidate a state 
law). 
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drug smuggling piracy, Congress could assert jurisdiction over 
an offense committed by a foreigner in a foreign vessel, what 
offense might not be brought within their power by the same 
device? Surely Congress could not regulate dueling on foreign 
vessels, as Justice Marshall put it. 
Most applications of the MDLEA that do not involve a U.S. 
nexus exceed Congress’s Define and Punish power. That clause 
only authorizes Congress to regulate conduct that either has 
some direct relation to the United States, or in a broader inter-
pretation, is universally cognizable in international law. In a 
narrower and quite plausible view of the clause, piracy is the 
only offense to which UJ can attach. Drug trafficking is not a 
UJ offense; nor does it fall under the similarly far-reaching pro-
tective principle of jurisdiction. Moreover, the MDLEA extends 
to vessels in foreign countries’ exclusive economic zones, and 
even in their territorial waters. This violates the clause’s expli-
cit limitation to crimes on the “high Seas.” 
Congress can exercise jurisdiction over stateless vessels, 
under international law, and the statelessness provisions of the 
MDLEA are perhaps the easiest to defend. Some of them go 
beyond the international law definition of stateless, but the dif-
ference may be within the margin of Congress’s power to “de-
fine.” There is a difficult argument to be made for the MDLEA 
as legislation pursuant to a treaty, if one takes a sufficiently 
broad view of what “necessary and proper” to a treaty is. How-
ever, the use of the Treaty Power to sustain the statute would 
depend on several other difficult and untested propositions, 
such as Congress being able go beyond its Article I powers in 
pursuance of non-mandatory (i.e., aspirational or permissive) 
treaties, and of treaties not yet on the books when the law is 
enacted.  
However, this does not doom U.S. drug interdiction efforts. 
The MDLEA could be saved through treaties permitting such 
jurisdiction with the various nations whose vessels are seized. 
The U.S. could also work towards and await the establishment 
of a customary international norm universalizing jurisdiction 
over drug trafficking. 
